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Abstract 
Author: Hunter Gierhart 
Title: How the Spotify Streaming Model Affects the Modern American 
Musician  
Supervising Professors: Oren Bracha and Dr. Tara Smith 
Throughout the digital era, issues concerning the fair compensation of 
creators have plagued various industries from film and academia to music. 
With the advent of music subscription services in a nascent 21st century, 
musicians, songwriters and their teams have raised this issue to new 
prominence.  
My thesis seeks to answer whether or not public policy needs to adjust 
in order to better compensate these musicians, and if this new model of 
consumption is truly treating them as unjustly as those in the industry like 
Taylor Swift suggest. By detailing prior recording industry models and 
analyzing American copyright law using utilitarianism and welfare 
economics, I argue that the streaming model is a continuation of prior 
industry practices and models, whereby money is largely siphoned off by 
groups and corporations, leaving creators with very little in comparison, but 
that the streaming model is good for musicians and consumers alike. 
Ultimately, the streaming model is a significant improvement upon the 
purchase model that dominated the industry in the 20th century. 
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INTRODUCTION	
 
Throughout the 2000s decade, the music recording industry lived and 
breathed by purchases of albums at concerts, in department stores, in coffee 
shops, and perhaps most critically, online. The industry was amid rapid 
digitization, but a new incarnation of it was just on the horizon.  
On July 14th, 2011, the Swedish music streaming company Spotify 
launched in the United States, its arrival treated by industry protagonists 
like that of a horseman of the apocalypse. Record labels began pulling their 
catalogs from the service in fear of music streaming “cannibalizing” digital 
and physical sales, motivated by a plethora of songwriter testimonials and 
articles, perhaps most infamously one that circulated a $167 payout to Lady 
Gaga for one million streams of her 2009 hit “Poker Face.” 
 Just a few months after Spotify’s American debut in 2012, I sat in a 
classroom during my freshman year of high school listening to music industry 
aficionado Scott Aiges warn of the new industry reality fast on approach, 
where consumers would no longer pay for single units of music, but instead 
pay recurring monthly subscriptions to services like Spotify, or not even pay 
at all. For the many aspiring musicians next to me at the New Orleans 
Center for Creative Arts, Aiges’ words implied that they would need to adapt 
to a world that was diverging from the one in which our idols grew up. 
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With Spotify burgeoning over the next few years, the debate over its 
royalty payments to musicians and songwriters reached a critical tipping 
point when in 2014, Taylor Swift pulled her entire music catalog off of 
Spotify. At the time, Swift was the most streamed artist on the platform. 
Justifying the move in the Wall Street Journal, Swift pinned the decision on 
her concern with the royalty rates that were being paid to her fellow 
musicians by the service. In her wake, Swift gave salience to a myriad of 
questions about the legitimacy of Spotify and music streaming at large, and 
whether or not musicians would be able to survive off of a business model 
that paid far less for a play of a song or album than a full purchase of it.  
While Swift herself has since returned her music catalog to Spotify, the 
question persists: is music streaming a sustainable source of income for 
musicians who are more often than not struggling to make ends meet? 
Moreover, what can or should policymakers do to respond? My thesis seeks to 
not only provide the context for this debate but also begin to devise the 
answers. Chapter 1 details the history of Spotify and the streaming model as 
well as the digitization of the music industry. Chapter 2 lays out the 
philosophical justifications for copyright and intellectual property in the 
United States. Chapter 3 presents the copyright statutes for musical works 
as well as the music industry structures that have to work with them. 
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the effects of the streaming model in a cost-
benefit framework using welfare economics as the lens of doing so. Because 
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this work ties in concepts and key terms from philosophy, intellectual 
property, and the music business, a glossary is available at the end of this 
paper for quick reference. 
The research that I am doing is primarily for musicians and those 
within the recording industry, as they have raised concern about possible 
inequities and flaws within the Spotify streaming model for the better half of 
a decade. While they may be the prime audience for this piece, because I am 
using frameworks and theories from intellectual property and economics to 
evaluate these concerns, experts in those fields are also within the broader 
audience of this work. The goal of this thesis is to provide the context 
necessary for understanding the current debate surrounding streaming 
royalties and to establish that the recording industry is not in crisis as some 
have been led to believe.  
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I.	The	Spotify	Streaming	Model	
 
This section seeks to provide the historical context for the rise in 
prevalence of the streaming model in the United States, from the physical 
album model in the 20th century, to digital downloads and music piracy that 
succeeded it in the 2000s and finally to Spotify’s formation and dominance in 
the industry today. In establishing this chronology, I will be setting up an 
argument for how the streaming model is a continuation of prior industry 
practices whereby money from royalties is siphoned off from creators and 
redirected to associated businesses and organizations. That set up will be 
fully realized in Section III, which concerns industry structures and 
practices. 
I will analyze Spotify in particular based on the following merits: while 
all other streaming services such as Apple Music and Tidal use variations of 
the same music-subscription model as Spotify, Spotify is viewed as the 
pioneer of it and is the streaming platform with the most paid subscribers.1 
While other music subscription services preceded Spotify like Rhapsody and 
Napster 2.0, Spotify experienced unmatched commercial success upon its 
arrival and irrevocably altered the American music industry in a way that 
these other, successive services did not. As the champion of the streaming 
model, it often garners the most scrutiny from academics and media sources, 
																																																								1	Spotify	Shareholder	Letter	Q4	2018.	(2019,	February	6).	1-13.	
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making an analysis of it more feasible and appropriate than the other 
services previously mentioned. 
In addition to the above, it should be noted that when referring to 
streaming services and models, I am referring to on-demand streaming 
services specifically. There are other types of music streaming that are not 
within the scope of this thesis. These types include streaming radio services 
like Pandora or iHeart radio, which prevent the listener from choosing which 
specific songs play but rather let the service determine what to play based on 
their preferences. This type of service is also referred to as a non-interactive 
service, as it negates a listener’s ability to choose specific musical pieces to 
play. Spotify offers non-interactive radio stations as a part of its services, but 
it is the interactive streaming that it is most well known for, and that will be 
the focus of this thesis. 
 
A.	Introduction	to	Spotify	
 
Spotify was founded in Sweden in 2006. The service officially launched 
in 2008 in a limited number of European countries before reaching the 
United States in 2011, after inking licensing agreements with the major 
worldwide record labels. These agreements provided Spotify with access to 
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label catalogs for negotiated royalty rates, and in exchange, the record labels 
obtained shares of the company itself.2 
Like other streaming services today such as Tidal and Apple Music, 
Spotify offers two subscription tiers: free, and premium. On its free tier, 
subscribers have access to Spotify’s catalog of music but are forced to listen to 
albums on “shuffle” when on mobile devices, and are additionally subjected to 
periodic 30-second advertisements. The premium subscription, by contrast, is 
approximately $10 a month and allows users to save music for offline 
listening, provides access to higher quality streams, and removes the 
“shuffle” restriction and all advertisements.  
Spotify has achieved significant success worldwide: at the end of 2018, 
Spotify reported that it had 96 million paid subscribers and 207 million total 
active users across 78 countries, generating nearly $6 billion in revenue.3 Its 
users have access to a catalog of 40 million songs covering 2,000 distinct 
genres, compared to the iTunes store’s catalog of 50 million songs.4  
While the above covers Spotify from the user or consumer’s 
perspective, it is the treatment of artists and copyright holders by this model 
that has generated the controversy that is the crux of this paper. Recording 																																																								2	Wikhamn,	Bjorn	Remneland,	and	David	Knights.	"Associations	for	Disruptiveness	–	The	Pirate	Bay	vs.	Spotify."	Journal	of	Technology	Management	&	
Innovation	11,	no.	3	(2016):	40-49.	3	While	the	company	has	generated	billions	in	revenue	over	the	past	several	years,	Q4	of	2018	was	the	first	quarter	ever	in	which	the	company	was	profitable.	Spotify,	supra	note	1.	4	iTunes	-	Music.	(n.d.).	Accessed	February	4,	2019.	https://www.apple.com/lae/itunes/music/		
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industry protagonists have widely criticized the streaming model from record 
labels and musicians alike as not sufficiently paying copyright holders. As 
Rolling Stone author Tim Ingram explained, the Spotify streaming model 
determines royalty payments as follows: 
 
“Spotify, in accordance with other leading audio streaming services, 
currently pays money to music rights-holders via a simple ‘pro rata’ 
model. Essentially, this means that the firm pools all of the 
distributable riches it generates each month, [and] then divvies up this 
cash based on the popularity of individual tracks. So, if five Drake 
songs pull in two percent of all subscriber plays in December, Drake 
(and the other folks who own rights to those five tracks) will get two 
percent of Spotify’s user-paid money.”5 
 
 
This “pro rata” model has two unique consequences: first, this model  
disproportionately concentrates the bulk of its royalty payments to the most 
streamed tracks and artists. Digital Media Finland found that the .4% most 
streamed tracks received nearly 9.9% of royalty payments, due in part to the 
second consequence, that users’ subscription payments do not go directly to 
the artists they stream, rather their payments are all pooled. Thus, if a user 
decides they will only stream music from Yo-Yo Ma, the distributable portion 
																																																								5	Ingham,	Tim.	"Should	Spotify	Change	the	Way	It	Pays	Artists?"	Rolling	Stone.	December	07,	2018.	Accessed	February	25,	2019.	https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/should-spotify-change-the-way-it-pays-artists-763986/.		
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of their subscription — about $6.99 — does not go directly to Ma but instead 
will go to other artists that the user did not stream.6  
The rise in prevalence of Spotify and the streaming model has been 
widely cited as instigating the demise of the album purchase or record sale 
model that commanded the industry ever since the development of vinyl LPs 
in 1948. While the streaming model’s ascent to dominance was so meteoric 
that it might appear abrupt, it is attributable to the two decades of 
digitization that preceded it. 
 
B.	The	Album	Purchase	Model	to	Digital	Piracy	
 
For most of the 20th century, the recording industry lived on the sales 
of physical albums in the form of either 12” vinyl LPs or cassette tapes, 
otherwise known as “analog” formats.7 After the advent of the compact disc 
(CD) in 1982, a new format was then added to this record-purchasing model: 
the digital format. The premise of the recording industry’s business model, 
however, remained the same as it had been for decades; consumers were 
buying individual, physical copies of music, distributed at brick and mortar 
																																																								6	Id.	7	An	analog	format	is	one	in	which	“information	is	stored	or	represented	in	the	form	of	some	continuously	variable	quantity:	the	shape	of	a	record	grove,	voltage,	the	position	of	a	magnetic	particles	on	a	tape,	and	so	on”	(Fisher,	14).	
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retailers, online webstores, concert venues, etc.8 By the late 80s, sales of 
analog records began to fall while sales of CDs began to rise.9 CDs began to 
overtake their analog counterparts mainly because digital recordings do not 
degrade over time, whereas analog recordings do.10 Burned copies of CDs are 
perfectly identical to their originals, and because CDs are a digital media, 
they can be compressed into files like the mp3 format and stored on other 
devices like a computer or flash drive as well.11 All of these qualities led to 
CDs commercially overtaking its analog equivalents rather quickly — they 
surpassed sales of cassette tapes by 199112 — and sparked concern within the 
recording industry. 
While analog formats of music were previously vulnerable to 
bootlegging, CDs made the practice far more viable. If one wanted to make a 
copy of an analog record like a 12” vinyl or cassette tape, they would have 
used a tape recorder, which creates a distorted copy with an audible “hiss,” 
i.e., a deteriorated copy. However, CDs, as a digital format, can produce 
perfect copies, which could be made or “burned” by any consumer with a 																																																								8	Cohn,	D.	Y.,	&	Vaccaro,	V.	L.	(2011).	The	Evolution	of	Business	Models	and	Marketing	Strategies	in	the	Music	Industry.	The	International	Journal	on	Media	
Management,	6(1),	46-58.	Retrieved	February	26,	2019.	9	Fisher,	William	W.	Promises	to	Keep:	Technology,	Law	and	the	Future	of	
Entertainment.	Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	Law	and	Politics,	2004,	at	p.	14.	10	While	some	audiophiles	may	argue	that	analog	formats	can	provide	better	sound	under	the	right	conditions	—	with	the	right	turntable	and	speakers,	etc.	—	this	is	largely	situational.	11	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	14-15.	12	Perry,	M.	J.	(2017,	April	30).	How	CDs	have	been	supplanted	by	music	streaming	|	Opinion.	Retrieved	February	26,	2019,	from	https://www.newsweek.com/how-cds-have-been-supplanted-music-streaming-588819		
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computer, and the songs could be downloaded from the CD onto the computer 
and rapidly distributed over the Internet.13 With CDs, the monopoly that 
record labels had on high-quality reproductions of musical recordings was 
broken.  While the record industry was aware that bootlegging was cutting 
into profit margins during the analog era – in 1984 the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) estimated that the industry lost $1.5 billion to 
the practice – they chose not to crack down on it because of the limitations of 
analog copies, and because consumers were adamant about their right to 
make them.14 Digital recording copies, however, presented a new dilemma 
worthy of a response, and the RIAA began pursuing litigation against illicit 
mp3 distributors as often as possible.15 By the time the RIAA stepped in, 165 
million songs were being illegally transferred every day.16 
Around the time that the recording industry began to launch its 
assault on digital piracy, the CD’s sharp rise in popularity was being followed 
by a short-lived reign of commercial dominance. By 2000, the American music 
saw unit sales of all physical albums, including CDs, decline by 3.7%, a trend 
that would continue largely uninterrupted to the present day, and one that 
has echoed across international recording industries as well.17 Left in the 
wake were increasing digital downloads for singles – single musical tracks – 																																																								13	Lam,	Calvin	K.M.,	and	Bernard	C.Y.	Tan.	"The	Internet	Is	Changing	the	Music	Industry."	Communications	of	the	ACM	44,	no.	8	(August	2001):	62.	14	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	84.	15	Lam,	supra	note	13.	16	In	the	US	or	WW?	Vroom,	G.,	&	Boquet,	I.	(2014).	Spotify:	Face	the	Music.	IESE	Business	School.	17	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	32.	
	 11	
courtesy of distributors like mp3.com and later iTunes, but also the 
appearances of services like Napster, Limewire, and the Pirate Bay. These 
services allowed users to illegally download digital copies of music for free 
using peer-to-peer technology.18 These illegal downloads were viewed as a 
hemorrhaging of potential paid downloads from an industry that was losing 
revenue for the first time, and thus drew the ire of the RIAA. It is worth 
mentioning, however, that even legal download services like iTunes were 
seen as cutting into profit margins as well, as consumers were now opting to 
buy single tracks from albums that they enjoyed as opposed to the entire 
record.19  
 
																																																								18	Peer	to	peer	technology	allows	one	user	to	download	encrypted	files	from	another	user’s	computer.	19	Covert,	A.	(2013,	April	25).	A	decade	of	iTunes	singles	killed	the	music	industry.	Retrieved	February	14,	2019,	from	https://money.cnn.com/2013/04/25/technology/itunes-music-decline/index.html.		
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Figure 1: Record Industry revenues over time, with breakdowns based on 
format. Since 2015 as streaming revenues have begun to rise, industry 
revenues overall have also been pushed up for the first time in more than a 
decade. Source: Nick Routley, Visual Capitalist. 
 
Spotify itself is the product of the Internet piracy that undercut the 
recording industry throughout the 2000s. For example, in its genesis, Spotify 
used pirated mp3 files instead of officially obtained versions.20 Though music 
is now streamed directly from Spotify’s servers since 2014, before this, songs 
																																																								20	Jones,	Rhett,	and	Rhett	Jones.	"Early	Spotify	Was	Built	on	Pirated	MP3	Files,	New	Book	Claims."	Gizmodo.	May	11,	2017.	Accessed	February	7,	2019.	https://gizmodo.com/early-spotify-was-built-on-pirated-mp3-files-new-book-1795109991.		
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were streamed in a peer-to-peer fashion, similar to torrent technology.21 This 
history is compounded by the fact that Daniel Ek, Spotify’s co-founder, was 
the CEO of µTorrent, a BitTorrent program. Given these ties to digital piracy, 
Spotify has argued that its merits should not be based on comparisons to 
digital downloading platforms like iTunes, but rather in comparison to digital 
piracy; i.e., Spotify contends that it has monetized a consumer behavior — 
piracy — that previously generated no revenue for the recording industry at 
all.22  
In the early 2010s, paid digital downloads consisted of as much as 50% 
of the music industry’s entire (shrinking) revenue.23 In the 16 years between 
2000 and 2015, industry revenues declined in 15 of them.  
As streaming began to grow exponentially in 2013 and 2014, digital 
downloads dropped, and with it, music industry revenues bottomed out at a 
third of 1999 levels, from $20.9 billion (adjusted for inflation) to $7 billion in 
2013 and 2014.24 Since then, however, industry revenues have been 
increasing year on year, a trend that did not exist in the digital download era. 
Today, with streaming reaching new heights in terms of consumption 
year after year, music industry revenues have begun to increase as well. In 
its 2017 report, Nielsen Soundscan noted “Streaming continued its leadership 																																																								21	Wikhman,	supra	note	2	at	p.	44.	22	This	contention	will	be	evaluated	in	a	successive	chapter,	but	it	is	worth	mentioning	here.	23	Marshall,	Lee.	"‘Lets	Keep	Music	Special.	F—Spotify’:	On-demand	Streaming	and	the	Controversy	over	Artist	Royalties."	Creative	Industries	Journal	8,	no.	2	(2015):	177-89.	doi:10.1080/17510694.2015.1096618.	24	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	75.	
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over downloads as the dominant music consumption platform of 2017, fueling 
the music industry’s overall volume growth of 12.5% year over year. The 
increase was led by a 58.7% increase in On-Demand Audio streams compared 
to 2016.” During the same period, however, total album sales and digital 
download equivalents25 declined by 19.2%.26  
 
C.	Criticisms	of	Spotify	and	the	Streaming	Model	
 
As Spotify and the streaming model it pioneered grew in prevalence in 
the recording industry, it attracted the criticism of musicians and industry 
protagonists alike. The first widely publicized criticism of Spotify emerged in 
2009, just one year after its official launch when it was reported that after 
1,000,000 streams of her single “Poker Face,” Lady Gaga received just $167 
from the service.27 Though the figure was misleading,28 the idea that Spotify 
did not compensate copyright owners fairly stuck, and by 2011, independent 
record labels had begun withdrawing their catalogs from the service. One of 
those labels was Projekt Records, and in a public statement, Projekt founder 
Sam Rosenthal wrote: “In the world I want to live in, I envision artists fairly 																																																								25	10	digital	track	downloads	are	considered	by	the	RIAA,	Nielsen	Soundscan,	and	Billboard	to	be	the	equivalent	of	1	album.	26	2017	Year	End	Music	Report.	Report.	Nielsen	Music.	1-33.	27	Marshall,	supra	note	23	at	p.	5.	28	Id.	The	figure	was	misleading	as	it	only	reflected	Gaga’s	publishing	royalty	(for	a	song	on	which	she	had	additional	co-writers)	after	deductions	from	her	streams	in	Sweden.	
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compensated for their creations...Spotify is NOT a service that does this. 
Projekt will not be part of this unprincipled concept.”29 Similarly, in 
announcing they were also withdrawing their catalog from on-demand 
streaming platforms, metal record label Century Media wrote: “This is about 
survival, nothing less and it is time that fans and consumers realize that for 
artists it is essential to sell music to keep their heads above water.”30 
Numerous other labels echoed these sentiments, including Prosthetic 
Records, Metal Blade, and Sumerian Records, whom all withdrew from 
Spotify by the end of 2011.31 
The issue of compensation reached a zenith in salience in 2014, as 
Country and Pop superstar Taylor Swift announced that she would be 
withdrawing her entire personal catalog from the service.32 At that time, 
Swift was the most listened to artist on Spotify.33 In a Time Magazine 
interview, Swift specified that the removal was not in response to the 
streaming model as a concept, rather that Spotify offered a free tier which 
doles out significantly lower royalties than its paid equivalent: “With Beats 
Music and Rhapsody you have to pay for a premium package in order to 
access my albums. And that places a perception of value on what I've created. 																																																								29	Marshall,	supra	note	23	at	p.	5.	30	Marshall,	supra	note	23	at	p.	5.	31	Id.	32	Her	record	label	at	the	time,	Nashville’s	Big	Machine	Records,	did	not	remove	its	catalog,	rather	this	was	a	decision	made	by	Swift	herself.	33	Rosenstein,	Ariel.	"How	Did	Taylor	Swift	Affect	Spotify."	SimilarWeb.	April	25,	2016.	Accessed	February	26,	2019.	https://www.similarweb.com/blog/what-does-the-taylor-swift-v-spotify-fallout-mean-for-music.		
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On Spotify, they don't have any settings or any kind of qualifications for who 
gets what music.”34 In an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal, Swift 
underpinned this argument with another: that music and art should be paid 
for. Swift wrote,  
 
“Music is art, and art is important and rare. Important, rare things are 
valuable. Valuable things should be paid for. It’s my opinion that 
music should not be free, and my prediction is that individual artists 
and their labels will someday decide what an album’s price point is. I 
hope they don’t underestimate themselves or undervalue their art.”35 
 
Numerous other musicians have echoed Swift’s argument that 
Spotify’s compensation model is disrespectful to artists as well: Icelandic 
singer Björk told Fast Company that she believes “This streaming thing just 
does not feel right. I don’t know why, but it just seems insane. ... To work on 
something for two or three years and then just, 'Oh, here it is for free.' It's not 
about the money; it’s about respect…”36  Thomas Yorke of Radiohead fame 
infamously referred to Spotify as “the last desperate fart of a dying corpse,” in 
																																																								34	Engel,	Pamela.	"Taylor	Swift	Explains	Why	She	Left	Spotify."	Business	Insider.	November	13,	2014.	Accessed	February	20,	2019.	https://www.businessinsider.com/taylor-swift-explains-why-she-left-spotify-2014-11.		 35	Linshi,	Jack.	"Taylor	Swift:	Why	Taylor	Swift	Pulled	Her	Music	From	Spotify."	Time.	November	03,	2014.	Accessed	February	21,	2019.	http://time.com/3554468/why-taylor-swift-spotify/.		36	Kreps,	D.	(2018,	June	25).	Bjork	on	Spotify:	'It	Just	Seems	Insane'.	Retrieved	February	26,	2019,	from	https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/bjork-keeping-vulnicura-off-spotify-it-just-seems-insane-59159/.		
	 17	
reference to the recording industry.37 Speaking to Mexican media outlet 
Sopitas, Yorke stated: 
 
“I feel like as musicians we need to fight the Spotify thing. I feel 
that in some ways what’s happening in the mainstream is the 
last gasp of the old industry. Once that does finally die, which it 
will, something else will happen. But it’s all about how we 
change the way we listen to music, it’s all about what happens 
next in terms of technology, in terms of how people talk to each 
other about music, and a lot of it could be really fucking bad. I 
don’t subscribe to the whole thing that a lot of people do within 
the music industry that’s ‘well this is all we’ve got left. we’ll just 
have to do this.’ I just don’t agree.”38  
 
While in the end, Swift’s move, in particular, did not have a direct, 
attributable economic effect on Spotify; it further raised the profile of these 
anti-Spotify arguments from within and outside of the recording industry. 
Spotify competitor Apple Music even increased its royalty payments during 
its free trial periods specifically to appease Swift.39 Furthermore, Swift, along 
with many of the labels mentioned above, have since returned their catalogs 
to the service.40 
 																																																								37	Renshaw,	David.	"Thom	Yorke	Labels	Spotify	'The	Last	Desperate	Fart	of	a	Dying	Corpse'."	NME.	October	04,	2013.	Accessed	March	31,	2019.	https://www.nme.com/news/music/radiohead-154-1246066.		38	Id.	39	"Apple	Music	Changes	Policy	after	Taylor	Swift	Stand."	BBC	News.	June	22,	2015.	Accessed	February	21,	2019.	https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-33220189.	40	Marshall,	supra	note	22	at	p.	7.	Swift	has,	however,	delayed	releases	of	subsequent	projects	on	Spotify,	such	as	her	sixth	studio	album	Reputation,	which	appeared	on	Spotify	a	month	after	its	release	for	physical	and	digital	purchase.	
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II.	Theoretical	Foundations	of	American	Copyright	Law	
 
Before introducing the specific statutes involved with music copyright 
and royalties in the United States, the philosophical foundations of American 
copyright law will be established so that the policy recommendations 
provided at the end of this paper are theoretically consistent with the current 
law, and are thus more viable. The objective in this section is to establish 
both the underlying theoretical and philosophical concepts needed to evaluate 
American copyright policy, and also to introduce the intellectual property 
concepts that illuminate and contextualize the current debate encompassing 
the merits of the streaming model. 
Most, if not all creative or expressive works — which includes music — 
have the same two features: the first being that once they are distributed to 
one individual, it is difficult if not impossible to limit their dissemination to 
others, i.e., they are nonexcludable. The second feature is that the enjoyment 
of these goods by one individual does not directly affect their enjoyment by 
another, the quality known as being nonrival or nonrivalrous.41 Beyond these 
two features, expressive works are also significantly cheaper to reproduce 
than to produce originally, which means that in a world without copyright, 
simply copying a work is more financially advantageous than creating one, 
which may deter potential creators from creating at all. 																																																								41	Bracha,	O.,	&	Syed,	T.	(June	2014).	Beyond	the	Incentive	—	Access	Paradigm?	Product	Differentiation	&	Copyright	Revisited.	Texas	Law	Review	
Association,	92(7),	page	1848.	
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The law seeks to remedy this dilemma by giving the creator of a work 
the ability to exclude others from copying their work, while also attempting to 
provide as much access as possible, given that these works are nonrivalrous 
by nature and copyright has to place some limits on access in order to 
incentivize creators.42 This push and pull known as the incentives-access 
paradigm is what frames economic debates around intellectual property,43 
with the controversy around Spotify being no exception. 
 
A.	Justification	of	Copyright	
 
Though the founding fathers and numerous Presidents – among them 
Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln – subscribed to the Lockeian view of 
intellectual property as a natural right,44 the Copyright Clause in section 
Article I Section 8. Clause 8 of the constitution nevertheless provides a 
utilitarian rationale. The clause grants Congress the power “To promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 																																																								42	When	modifying	copyright,	lawmakers	work	to	keep	access	in	mind	as	these	creative	works	would	have	no	limits	on	access	in	a	world	without	copyright,	given	that	it	is	difficult	to	exclude	their	use	and	not	useful	to	do	so	given	that	they	are	nonrivalous.	Legislators	strive	to	maximize	access,	as	it	is	perhaps	the	ideal	feature	of	creative	works	that	they	can	be	shared	by	all	equally.	43	Bracha,	supra	note	41	at	p.	1848.	44	Abraham	Lincoln,	Speech	at	Chicago,	Illinois,	in	2	Collected	Works	of	Abraham	Lincoln	493	(R.P.	Basler	et	al.	ed.	1953),	“each	individual	is	naturally	entitled	to	do	as	he	pleases	with	himself	and	the	fruit	of	his	labor.”	Letter	from	Thomas	Jefferson	to	Isaac	McPherson	(August	13th,	1813),	in	13	The	Writings	of	Thomas	Jefferson	326,	“That	ideas	should	feely	spread	from	one	to	another	over	the	globe…	seems	to	have	been	peculiarly	benevolently	designed	by	nature.”	
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and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries,”45 propelling the notion that copyright’s purpose in the United 
States is to provide incentives to creators and maximize social good, in line 
with utilitarian reasoning. 
As many scholars in the field of intellectual property and lawmakers 
have argued, the utilitarian approach is the most popular (and familiar) 
approach for justifying and understanding copyright law and intellectual 
property within the United States.46 Utilitarianism “requires lawmakers to 
strike an optimal balance between, on one hand, the power of exclusive rights 
to stimulate the creation of inventions and works of art and, on the other, the 
partially offsetting tendency of such rights to curtail widespread public 
enjoyment of those works” in order to maximize social welfare or utility.47  
In order to provide a financial incentive for authors to create, 
utilitarian theory introduces the concept of copyright, which allows a creator 
to exclude others from reproducing their work, distributing copies of it, or 
from preparing a derivative work on it for a given period of time. These legal 
exclusions increase the opportunity for creators to recoup their investment by 
sanctioning those who seek to profit from their works without the copyright 
																																																								45	U.S.	Const.	art.	I,	§	8.	46	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	1;	Harper	&	Row,	Publishers	v.	Nation	Enters.,	471	U.S.	539,	558	(1985),	Fromer,	J.	C.	(December	2012).	Expressive	Incentives	in	Intellectual	Property.	Virginia	Law	Review,	98	(8),	1745-1824.	Retrieved	March	2,	2019.	 47	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	1.	
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holder’s consent.48 While artistic works are nonexcludable and nonrivalrous 
by nature, copyright works to cancel out these qualities; while being able to 
exclude others from distributing a creative work is the primary purpose of 
copyright, it creates drag by making these works rivalrous.  
As mentioned above, creative works are nonrivalrous by nature, which 
is not true of other forms of property. For example, one can share a digital 
music file with as many people as possible, and one person’s enjoyment of 
that work is not affected by someone else’s use or enjoyment of that same 
music file. This is different than from one, for example, sharing an apple with 
his or her friends: there is only so much enjoyment that each person can have 
of that apple before it is gone. By making creative works excludable, 
copyright places limits on who is able to enjoy a work, which works against 
their naturally nonrivalrous nature, perhaps the most desirable feature of 
creative works. 
To illustrate how copyright does this, let us imagine a world in which 
there is no copyright, and that I have just recorded an album. I have put in 
thousands of dollars into the creative process — paying for time in a 
recording studio, and compensation for sound engineers, musicians, etc. — 
and after its completion, I release the album for a simple, one-time purchase 
on my website.49 Within hours, download links begin to sprout across the 
Internet, all of which allow a user to download my album for free. Without 																																																								48	Supra	note	39.	49	We’re	assuming	that	I	am	not	using	a	distributor	who	would	cut	into	my	profit	margins	from	my	album.	
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copyright, I have no legal recourse to remove those download links, and I now 
stand little chance of recouping my financial investment into my album, as 
potential buyers of my work are instead downloading it for free. There is, 
therefore, no incentive for me to continue to create; after all, I spent 
thousands to create my work while others are downloading it for free and the 
costs to copy it thereafter are nominal.50 From a financial perspective, why 
would any creator continue to pursue works of intellectual property when 
they could copy another’s work for significantly less, or turn toward a more 
lucrative career?51 Copyright could remedy this predicament by allowing me 
to exclude others from copying and distributing my work for a limited 
duration, increasing my chances of recouping my investment, and therefore 
giving me the incentive to create.  
In the scenario above, copyright provides incentive, but it also limits 
access. Let’s say that my copyright now offers me sweeping protections, so 
much so that I am able to recoup not just the cost of my investment into the 
creation of my work, but maximize my possible profits from it. This broad 
copyright protection inherently limits the public’s access to my work by 
giving me the power to price my works so that some people cannot or will not 																																																								50	As	illustrated	by	this	example	and	the	prior	discussion	on	bootlegging	analog	copies	of	sound	recordings,	the	digital	era	has	significantly	compounded	the	disparity	between	the	costs	of	creating	and	the	costs	of	copying.		51	Fisher,	supra	note	9.	A	creator	may	continue	to	create	if	they	do	not	mind	losing	their	investment	into	the	product,	such	as	an	amateur	painter	or	someone	who	creates	as	a	hobby	out	of	passion,	but	the	concern	here	is	for	those	who	wish	to	make	a	career	out	of	creative	expression.	
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pay the price that I have set. This group of people is now inhibited from the 
use of the works that I have created and thus causes limitations on access, 
given that one individual’s enjoyment of a work does not affect any other’s 
enjoyment of the same work. After all, from the perspective of static use, the 
limiting of public access is only a consequence of copyright. As creative works 
are nonrivalrous, limiting the public’s ability to use these works only hinders 
one of the great, inherent features of those works.52 These short anecdotes 
are used to illustrate the fact that copyright cannot create a world in which 
access and incentives are both operating at 100%.53 
Copyright itself, however, builds its own paradox: by limiting public 
access, it also limits the creation of new creative works. Expressive works to 
greatly varying degrees rely on the creative works and ideas before it,54 so by 
excluding some potential consumers who would not be detracting from other’s 
enjoyment of the work,55 copyright has also constricted future innovations 																																																								52	Bracha,	Oren.	"Give	Us	Back	Our	Tragedy:	Nonrivalry	in	Intellectual	Property	Law	and	Policy."	Theoretical	Inquiries	in	Law	19,	no.	2	(2018):	633-70	at	p.	647.	 53	We	can	imagine	other	solutions	to	this	predicament,	however:	the	government	could	provide	grants	to	provide	incentives	like	they	do	with	academic	research,	or	subsidize	the	costs	of	my	production.	However,	the	possible	effects	of	these	solutions	are	outside	the	scope	of	this	particular	project,	and	are	seen	from	the	utilitarian	perspective	as	using	more	social	resources	than	they	would	otherwise	save.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	time	limits	on	copyright	–	in	addition	to	the	scope	of	the	copyright	–	serve	to	balance	the	relationship	between	access	and	incentive.	Fisher,	supra	note	9,	at	p.	2.	54	To	illustrate	this	in	an	exaggerated	manner,	it	would	be	very	difficult	for	one	to	create	a	musical	work	if	they	had	no	access	to	the	music	of	others	whatsoever.			55	Bracha,	supra	note	36,	at	p.	1850.	
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based on copyrighted creative works. For example, consider	a	nascent	world	with	very	strong	copyright	protections:	successive	copyright	protections	on	top	of	this	would	chill	the	creation	of	new	works.	Copyright	would	never	completely	freeze	creation,	but	you	get	more	cost	than	benefit	to	creation	at	a	certain	margin	where	it	would	begin	to	slow.	The paradox that emerges here is that copyright hinders 
the development of future expressive works when part of its purpose is to 
provide an incentive to create these works to begin with.  
In short, the primary takeaway from the above normative perspective 
is that there are two particular inefficiencies of copyright as a solution to the 
incentive problem: 1) static deadweight loss, which is the limiting of public 
consumption that would not occur were copyright not to exist, and 2), 
dynamic deadweight loss, the limitation of access which creates a drag on 
future innovation. If we are to accept copyright as the proper solution to the  
incentives-access problem — which, for the purposes of this thesis, we are — 
then it suffices to say that there must be an optimal balance between these 
two forces, where drag is minimized, and incentives are maximized.56  
																																																								56	Day,	Brian	R.	"In	Defense	of	Copyright:	Creativity,	Record	Labels,	and	the	Future	of	Music."	SSRN	Electronic	Journal,	2011.	doi:10.2139/ssrn.1609689.	As	determined	in	Mazer	v.	Stein,	347	U.S.	201,	219	(1954)	and	Eldred	v.	Ashcroft,	537	U.S.	186,	212	n.18	(2001),	the	Supreme	Court	has	determined	that	intellectual	property	rights	ensure	the	progress	and	development	of	not	just	the	arts	but	the	sciences	as	well	in	order	to	“enrich	the	public	domain.”		A	concern	that	may	arise	from	this	discussion	is	the	delegating	upon	the	government	the	power	to	incentivize	certain	behavior.	From	a	libertarian	perspective,	if	we	do	not	want	the	government	to	censor	or	prohibit	certain	civic	activities,	why	would	we	allow	the	government	to	incentivize	them?	Copyright,	much	like	freedom	of	speech	in	the	United	States,	is	content	neutral;	all	creative	works	are	entitled	to	copyright	protections	much	like	any	person’s	speech	is	
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It is ultimately up to policymakers to find this marginally optimal 
balance, and unfortunately for them, the information required to find this 
harmony is impossible in practice. If lawmakers had infinite information, 
they could seek to provide enough IP rights to each individual creator so that 
he or she would have exactly enough incentive to continue creating and no 
more.57 Instead, they have to issue one, universal standard of copyright based 
on their cost-benefit estimations that leaves some creators unable to cross the 
line of having enough incentive, and others well past it. The question, 
therefore, for lawmakers when making adjustments to intellectual property 
rights is whether or not providing more copyright protections would help 
enough creators cross the incentive line to outweigh its restrictions on public 
access. At some point, the copyright policy reaches the marginal tipping point 
where the balance between incentives and access is equal, and no further 
adjustments are necessary. 
In an attempt to mediate the relationship between incentives and 
access as well as the paradox above, copyright laws are constrained in both 																																																																																																																																																																					protected	so	long	as	it	does	not	infringe	upon	another’s	rights.	While	there	is	a	tension	between	freedom	of	speech	and	copyright	as	copyright	does	exclude	some	from	accessing	a	work,	both	concepts	were	enshrined	in	the	Constitution	by	the	Framers	at	the	same	time.	Copyright	protections	are	ultimately	used	to	generate	more	content,	regardless	of	its	content,	in	the	same	manner	that	freedom	of	speech	rights	are	used	to	promote	speech	regardless	of	its	content	as	well.	57	In	an	economist’s	view,	a	creator	would	never	reap	all	of	the	potential	value	of	their	copyrighted	work,	but	copyright	should	aim	to	give	them	just	enough	incentive	to	create,	which	in	a	simplified	world	would	be	one	in	which	they	break	even	from	their	initial	investment.	The	more	accurate	version	in	a	world	with	unlimited	information	would	be	one	where	copyright	ensures	that	one	creates	instead	of	going	for	alternatives	like	pursuing	a	career	in	stock	brokering,	for	example,	but	of	course,	this	is	not	feasible	in	practice.	
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duration and scope. The duration of copyrights in the United States varies 
depending on the circumstances of creation,58 while the scope of copyright 
protection is constrained in order to facilitate the production of new works. 
For example, if someone wanted to record a parody version of my album, 
wide-ranging copyright protections may prevent him or her from doing so, 
while more narrow protections would allow this to take place.  
 
B.	Critiques	of	and	Concerns	With	Utilitarianism	
 
At this point, a few problems with the utilitarian approach should be 
made apparent, albeit without getting too bogged down in them. For example 
utilitarianism is a demanding theory when applied to ethics: for example, “if 
a doctor can save five people from death by killing one healthy person and 
using that person’s organs for life-saving transplants, then act utilitarianism 
implies that the doctor should kill the one person to save five.”59  In this 
																																																								58	As	the	U.S.	Patent	and	Trademark	Office	describes,	“The	duration	of	copyright	protection	depends	on	several	factors.	For	works	created	by	an	individual,	protection	lasts	for	the	life	of	the	author,	plus	70	years.	For	works	created	anonymously,	pseudonymously,	and	for	hire,	protection	lasts	95	years	from	the	date	of	publication	or	120	years	from	the	date	of	creation,	whichever	is	shorter.”	The	durations	of	copyright	have	also	been	subject	to	change	over	time.	
Trademark,	Patent,	or	Copyright?	U.S.	Patent	and	Trademark	Office,	http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/trademark-patent-or-copyright	59	“Act	utilitarianism”	is	the	ethical	application	of	utilitarianism	whereby	a	person	is	only	acting	in	a	morally	righteous	way	if	and	only	if	his	or	her	actions	produce	the	best	possible	results	in	a	given	scenario,	i.e.,	the	most	good	for	the	most	number	of	people.	
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scenario, utilitarianism coerces its followers into killing another person for 
the sake of benefitting the majority, theoretically creating a society in which 
doctors are killing bystanders for the sake of harvesting their organs for 
those who need them. 
Utilitarianism is additionally not concerned with the distribution of 
states of pleasure, but rather what the total sums of that distribution are. 
For example, if the consequence of a given action generates happiness for all 
members of a society except for one, then that one person’s considerations are 
effectively rendered moot.60 They would therefore be subject to the “tyranny 
of the majority.”  
The greatest flaw of utilitarianism for our purposes however, is that 
utilitarian theory poses here is that there is no method for determining which 
legal arrangement generates the most societal good, as measured in an ideal 
theoretical world by generating a sum for all individual states of pleasure or 
benefit in a group and measure that against a sum for all states of 
displeasure or detriment. But of course, in practice, this is more intractable, 
and issues arise from this definition. While it is clear that utilitarianism tries 
to balance the oscillation between incentives and access to maximize social 
welfare, the values that it assigns to each force is imprecise at best. 
Utilitarianism thus requires a nebulous calculus to contrast the total net 
social welfare that different solutions offer to the incentives-access problem.  																																																																																																																																																																					Nathanson,	Stephen.	"Act	and	Rule	Utilitarianism."	Internet	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy.	Accessed	March	31,	2019.	https://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/#SH3b.		60	Id.	
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These weaknesses do present a problem for lawmakers trying to offer a 
solution to the incentives-access paradigm (and others), but for the purposes 
of this analysis, the utilitarian framework is useful and insightful in 
evaluating the costs and benefits of the streaming model. While this 
framework requires infinite information for policy making — which we will of 
course never be able to obtain — what it can be used for instead is deriving 
guidelines for public policy by making rough predictions on the effects of 
certain actions. Given that American copyright law sits upon a utilitarian 
foundation, justifying a public policy adjustment toward music streaming in 
utilitarian terms is consistent with this foundation. Not only this 
justification, but utilizing this approach will place my proposal within the 
American IP discourse at large, as utilitarianism is, as previously mentioned, 
the framework of choice by academics.  
For this paper, I will be using the economic equivalent of 
utilitarianism known as welfare economics for evaluating the streaming 
model. Whereas utilitarianism is concerned with the maximization of states 
of pleasure or utility and minimizing harm or pain, welfare economics seeks 
“the economic state that will create the highest overall level of social 
satisfaction among its members” as measured by wealth or money.61 
Utilitarianism does not have a way of measuring states of happiness against 
those of pain, which makes the framework difficult to apply in that manner. 																																																								61	Kenton,	Will.	"Welfare	Economics."	Investopedia.	March	12,	2019.	Accessed	March	25,	2019.	https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/welfare_economics.asp.		
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By contrast, welfare economics measures these states or utility in money, 
which solves this particular issue.62 In performing a cost-benefit analysis of 
Spotify, I will, therefore, be using money as the means of calculating the 
impact on incentives vs. access. However, welfare economics inherently 
introduces another litany of issues, such as the exclusion of some groups from 
these calculations, which are further addressed in Section IV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								62	Because	utility	is	abstract	and	impossible	to	measure,	for	my	purposes	we	are	defining	money	—	one’s	willingness	and	ability	to	pay	for	something	—	as	a	measure	of	utility	and	the	states	of	pleasure	and	displeasure.	Within	welfare	economics,	the	market	assigns	negative	and	positive	values	to	a	given	product	or	arrangement	by	using	money.	
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III.	Musical	Copyright	and	Industry	Structures	
 
In order to proceed with this essay, it is crucial that the reader 
understand some of the fundamental pieces of both the legal frameworks that 
govern the music industry, as well as how the industry operates in practice in 
the United States. Many different tangents may arise in attempting to 
establish this overview; however, the only topics elaborated on here will 
concern the streaming model. Other valid and compelling discussions on, for 
example, music sampling, are outside the scope of this document and thus 
will not be covered in-depth. 
 
A.	Two	Musical	Copyrights	
 
Every musical piece is entitled to two copyrights in the United States 
once it is fixed in a tangible medium:63 copyright for the underlying 
composition of a song, and the second for a sound recording. The first 
copyright, for composition, is for the songwriter or composer. The melody, 
rhythms, and instrumental arrangements would all fall under this type of 
copyright, essentially encompassing a song as it would be recorded on sheet 
music. The second copyright, for a sound recording, is for the recording artist. 
Their performance of a song as recorded by microphones (and potentially 																																																								63	A	tangible	medium	is	a	physical	manifestation	of	a	musical	work	like	a	CD	or	hard	drive	with	an	MP3	file,	or	a	set	of	instructions	for	its	recreation	in	the	absence	of	its	creator,	such	as	sheet	music.			
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further mixed and mastered by producers) functions under a separate 
copyright than the songwriter’s.  
To illustrate this difference, let us consider the case of a cover 
recording. In 1970, the Jackson 5 released their hit single “I’ll Be There” 
through Motown Records. The song was written by Berry Gordy et al., and 
performed by the Jackson 5. Therefore, Berry Gordy would (theoretically) 
own the copyright for the composition of the song, while the Jackson 5 and 
Motown Records would own the copyright for their specific recording of that 
composition. When Mariah Carey recorded and released the song in 1992 as a 
part of her MTV Unplugged set through Columbia Records, Berry Gordy et 
al. still owned the copyright for the composition of Carey’s cover, while Carey 
and Columbia maintained the copyright of her recorded performance. The 
Jackson 5 were entitled to no legal rights to any part of Carey’s recording, as 
they did not write the song, even though they indisputably popularized it. If 
one were to stream either the Jackson 5 or Mariah Carey’s version of the song 
on Spotify, he or she would be streaming musical works in which both 
composition and recording copyrights are present64.  
It is important to note that the copyrights for a musical composition 
and an audio recording are not equal in scope; the copyright for a sound 
recording affords mush narrower protections. If one were to go into a studio 
and record a cover of the Beatles’ “Hey Jude” and attempted to mimic every 
																																																								64	17	U.S.C.	§	1101(a)(2)	(1998).	
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growl, distortion and pitch fluctuation in Paul McCartney’s vocal in the 
original recording as possible, it would not be an infringement of the audio 
recording copyright. An audio recording’s copyright is only violated in the 
case that the exact fixed sounds in the recording are used without permission 
of the copyright holder.  Simply emulating those sounds does not constitute 
an infringement. However, the copyright for a musical composition is 
infringed upon in the case that one tries to imitate it. 
 
B.	Copyright	Protections	
 
As seen above, each of these copyrights provides different and similar 
types of protections and rights. Every copyright in the United States affords 
the owner certain liberties, which will be covered here, using music industry 
cases as examples. In this section, the rights described are more theoretical 
than practical: exceptions to the rights described here will be discussed in the 
following section of this chapter. 
First, copyrights provide the owner with the exclusive right to control 
the reproduction of their work. In the music industry, musical compositions 
are reproduced as phonorecords, which are defined as “material objects in 
which sounds ...are fixed ... and from which the sounds can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
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machine or device.”65 Composers can, for example, decide who can sell their 
work in phonorecords as sheet music, and audio recording copyright holders 
may choose in which format their recordings are manifested. Phonorecords of 
a recording contain both an underlying composition and a specific recording 
of a song, and thus both copyright owners are entitled to protections and 
rights of it.66  
Copyright owners may additionally decide who distributes their work. 
This second right is separate from reproduction: for example, a 
manufacturing plant reproduces a work in a phonorecord such as a CD or LP, 
whereas a record label distributes these copies. The entity that reproduces a 
musical work is not always the one that distributes or sells it. The copyright 
owner may choose who has the right to distribute their works. 
The third and final right necessary to know for our purposes67 is the 
right to public performance. As a composer, one has the right to choose when 
and where someone may publicly perform his or her work. If one were to 
happen upon a street performer in Times Square covering their composition, 
they would have the right to stop that performance (or, by the same function, 
to let it continue). This public performance right extends not just to live 																																																								65	Id.	§	101	("phonorecords").		66	Reese,	R.	Anthony.	"Copyright	and	Internet	Music	Transmissions:	Existing	Law,	Major	Controversies,	Possible	Solutions."	SSRN	Electronic	Journal,	3rd	ser.,	55,	no.	2	(January	1,	2001):	237-73,	at	p.	241,	242.	67	There	are	two	other	distinct	rights	for	copyright	holders	that	exist	but	are	not	relevant	for	our	discussion:	the	right	to	make	a	derivative	work,	and	the	right	to	display	a	work	publicly.	The	former	in	the	context	of	the	music	industry	would	concern	the	use	of	“sampling,”	while	the	latter	would	apply	to	websites	that	display	lyrics	of	a	song.	
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performances, but “performances” of a sound recording as well, however, the 
public performance right in this case is very narrow. AM/FM radio 
transmissions, for example, are exempt from the public performance right; 
however, Congress determined that there is a public performance right for 
digital transmissions of a sound recording over satellite radio and Internet 
radio.  
Of course, no one copyright owner can police every public avenue for 
public performances of their songs. Instead, they sign deals with Performance 
Rights Organizations (PROs), which, in the US, mainly consist of BMI, 
ASCAP, and SESAC, which will do this policing for the composers. More 
elaboration on the role of PROs will follow in later sections of this paper. 
 
C.	Compulsory	Licenses	
 
Of course, none of these rights is as unambiguous as presented here. 
Numerous exceptions and exemptions mediate these rights. While it is not 
necessary to elaborate on each of these for the scope of this project, there are 
a few which are important to understanding the context and debate 
surrounding music streaming in the United States. 
The first is the idea of a “compulsory license,” in which an activity 
which would ordinarily infringe upon one’s copyrights is legally permissible if 
the actor pays a fee or royalty as determined by the federal government, and 
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abides by further rules and restrictions68.  In these cases, a copyright owner 
is forced to yield his or her work to the public and is not given the authority 
to charge his or her own fee or rate for this use.  
A musical copyright owner is only compelled to issue a license in this 
manner if all of the following conditions are met:69 
1. The musical work is classified as “non-dramatic”70 
2. It has been previously recorded 
3. This recording has been distributed publicly 
4. The new recording does not change the character or melody of 
the song 
5. The new recording is only used in phonorecords 
The “previously recorded” clause affords a copyright owner the right of “first 
use.” The copyright owner is allowed to determine how they want to the 
public to first be exposed to their song. The third condition — public 
distribution — closes a loophole so that if an artist records a song and doesn’t 
choose to release it that the compulsory license is not triggered.71  
																																																								68	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	41.	69	Passman,	Donald	S.	All	You	Need	to	Know	About	the	Music	Business.	9th	ed.	New	York,	NY:	Viking,	2015,	at	p.	230.	70	It	is	not	clear	what	qualifies	a	song	as	“non-dramatic”,	but	is	thought	of	as	excluding	compositions	in	dramatic	performances	such	as	operas	or	musicals.	71	Songwriters	often	circulate	their	works	to	various	recording	artists	within	the	music	industry.	For	example,	Lady	Gaga	wrote	the	2009	song	“Telephone”	and	offered	the	track	to	Britney	Spears,	who	then	recorded	it.	After	Spears	decided	not	to	release	it,	Lady	Gaga	publicly	released	her	recording	of	the	song	instead.	Spears’	initial	recording	did	not	open	the	floodgates	for	anyone	else	to	record	and	release	the	song	as	he	or	she	pleased	because	of	this	provision,	though	Gaga’s	did.	
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The fourth provision allows one to rearrange a song to fit his or her 
“manner of interpretation,” but would prevent someone like “Weird Al” 
Yankovic from obtaining a compulsory license to take one’s musical piece and 
parody it. 
The fifth condition is where the issue becomes more opaque than the 
previous: here, phonorecords only refers to audio recordings. This clause is 
the result of successful lobbying from music publishers for the 1976 
Copyright Act. The consequence of it is that home video devices — most 
infamously a VCR and DVD player — do not count as phonorecords, so 
motion picture companies must negotiate with copyright owners for the usage 
of their musical works.72 Phonorecords do, however, apply to digital 
downloads known as DPDs (digital phonorecord delivery), such as those from 
iTunes. 
If the above conditions are satisfied, one may file notices the copyright 
office and begin issuing payments for their usage. Under a compulsory 
license, the copyright holder is paid at the “Statutory rate,” which is set by 
the United States Copyright Board. At present, the mechanical royalty rate73 
— i.e., the rate for producing a copy of a song — is set at 9.1 cents or 1.75 
cents per minute of the musical composition, whichever is greater. The 
statutory rate is re-certified by a panel of three judges every two years with 																																																								72	Passman,	supra	note	55.	73	This	may	also	be	shorthanded	as	“mechanicals.”	The	name	derives	from	the	practice	of	music	publishing	companies	in	the	early	1900s	using	a	piano-roll	to	reproduce	a	musical	work.	
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the input of industry protagonists but has not increased from its current rate 
since January 1st, 2006.74  
The most notable case where a compulsory license is used is concerning 
the public performance right. Digital Radio stations in the United States – in 
compliance with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) – have 
compulsory licenses; meaning that they can play (or “perform”) any publicly 
released sound recording whenever they please. This rule holds for satellite 
(XM) and Internet radio stations (ex. Pandora).75   
Otherwise, compulsory licenses are not used often. Record companies 
would prefer to track these licenses themselves than hand them off to 
bureaucrats. However, the mechanical royalty is pivotal in the industry 
because it is the maximum that anyone would be willing to pay for the use of 
the work.76 
The government’s sole justification and legal basis for the creation of 
the compulsory license was to prevent the formation of a monopoly.77 In the 
United States, the compulsory license emerged in music as a result of the 
Supreme Court decision White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo 
Company (1908) and its subsequent undermining by the US Congress: while 																																																								74	A	timeline	of	the	mechanical	royalty	rate	can	be	found	here:	https://www.harryfox.com/license_music/what_mechanical_royalty_rates.html		75	AM	and	FM	radio	transmissions	do	not	implicate	sound	recording	performance	rights	because	there	is	no	entitlement;	compulsory	licenses	kick	in	with	digital	audio	transmission	where	this	is	a	limited	entitlement.		76	Passman,	supra	note	55	at	p.	233.	77	7(d):	“The	danger	of	a	monopoly	in	the	situation	existing	in	1909	was	apparently	the	sole	reason	for	the	compulsory	license.”	
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the Supreme Court ruled that sheet music was not a copy of a composition 
(rather parts of a piano roll),78 Congress superseded this decision by passing 
the Copyright Act of 1909, which recognized a right to create mechanical 
reproductions, and also created the compulsory mechanical license (and thus 
the mechanical royalty rate).  
At the time, the piano roll firm the Aeolian Company dominated the 
industry and stood to gain enormously from this additional right. To mediate 
the concerns of smaller firms, Congress added the compulsory license. The 
consequences of the license, however, reached far beyond its intended effect. 
The fears of an Aeolian monopoly may have been unfounded, as numerous 
competitors to the Aeolian Company sprouted after the Copyright Act, which 
neutralized the initial rationale for the license. However, something else 
occurred: record labels became reliant on the license, and their influence has 
kept the compulsory license in effect ever since. The Copyright Act of 1976 
and subsequent legislation eventually replaced this Act, but the compulsory 
license remains as a result.79  
Copyright owners80 object to the compulsory license because it strips 
them of their agency to set their own rates and control the audio distribution 
of their works. They have a legal basis for revoking the license as well: as 																																																								78	209	U.S.	1	(1908).	79	Merges,	Robert	P.	"Errata:	Contracting	into	Liability	Rules:	Intellectual	Property	Rights	and	Collective	Rights	Organizations."	California	Law	Review	84,	no.	2	(October	1996):	1293-393,	at	p.	1308-1310.	80	As	will	be	described	in	the	next	section	of	this	chapter,	copyright	owners	in	this	case	mainly	refers	to	composers	and	music	publishing	companies.	
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there is no longer a threat of monopoly in the music industry, the compulsory 
license is no longer justified. A 1961 Congressional report laid out the points 
arguing for the license’s benevolence: 
“(1) It provides the public with a variety of recordings of any 
particular musical work, which might not be true if the 
copyright owner could give an exclusive license to one record 
company. 
(2) It enables smaller record companies to compete with the 
larger ones by offering other recordings of the same music.  
3) It benefits authors and publishers by giving their works 
public exposure through several different recordings, thereby 
increasing their revenue from royalties.” 
The report then, however, eviscerated this line of thinking, 
recommended that the compulsory license be eliminated. The report 
pointed out that the music industries of countries without compulsory 
licenses grew just as much as that of the United States, and that while 
exclusive licenses would reduce the frequency of multiple recordings of 
the same song, it would thereby pressure record companies to make 
more copies of different songs. 
Revoking the mechanical license now would perhaps have an effect 
beyond forcing record labels to potentially pay rates beyond the mechanical 
rate: if every musical copyright owner had the right to negotiate their own 
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rates and fees, there would be an infinite web of negotiations between 
different parties at all times, and the industry may grind to a halt.81 This 
dilemma could, however, be remedied in the case that the statute was 
revoked by leaving its provisions in place long enough for the industry to 
adjust.82  
This aspect of copyright raises an important question: can the value of 
the public’s access to an artist’s work outweigh the benefit of giving an artist 
complete autonomy over their creation? If so, how should these competing 
interests be balanced in the eyes of the law? This dilemma has been present 
since the dawn of copyright law and is especially prevalent in the digital age 
where access to artistic material is widespread, and the cost of this access is 
nominal. Additionally, this question is consistently raised by artists in 
objection to the streaming model and will be evaluated in the final chapter of 
this paper. 
 
D.	Industry	Structures	
 
With the essential legal frameworks of the United States established, 
it is necessary to know the relevant actors — organizations, businesses, and 
institutions — that have established themselves within the music industry. 
This background will not be all-encompassing: as the issue at hand is 																																																								81	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	42.	82	The	1961	Congressional	report	recommends	a	one-year	transition	period	as	being	sufficient.			
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royalties from music streaming services, this section will lay out how money 
trades hands within the music industry under copyright law, and how a 
check from a company like Spotify would eventually reach a musical artist. 
Because of this, there will not be an in-depth discussion concerning, for 
example, synchronization licenses in movies and television. 
To begin, we will start with a songwriter and one of their (likely many) 
copyrighted works. As mentioned briefly on page 6, a songwriter cannot 
realistically monitor every possible avenue for violations of their copyright, 
nor negotiate with every interested party like a record label or movie 
production company usage of their material. Instead, what is most common 
within the music industry is for a songwriter to assign or split their rights 
with a music publishing company. Each contract with a music publisher and 
an artist is, of course, different depending on numerous factors such as their 
relationships within the industry and their knowledge of it, but one’s 
copyright is divisible,83 and songwriters most often allocate more of these 
rights to a publisher than less of them. A standard deal would entail splitting 
royalties from the copyright 50/50. 84 In return, a publishing company can 
offer to promote the copyrighted work and possibly offer a monetary advance 
in exchange for the various rights described in the previous section. The 
publishing company will be able to reap royalties from the copyright, which 
																																																								83	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	47.	84	Passman,	supra	note	55	at	p.	236.	
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encourages them to promote the work — and thus the songwriter — to 
generate more revenue from it. 
Promotion for the music publisher would entail issuing reproduction 
licenses to sheet music printers, synchronization licenses for movies and 
television shows, as well as arranging the first commercial recording of the 
composition. Many artists in the music industry write and record their music, 
but still many rely on songwriters to compose great works for them. In the 
case that a composer or songwriter wishes to make the first commercial 
recording of their work, this would be referred to as a “controlled 
composition.” For this example, we will assume that the writer does not 
record the song to illustrate just how divided a musical royalty may be.  
A music publisher and a recording company have to agree on the usage 
of a song, and in order to do so, they usually — but not necessarily — rely on 
an intermediary to act as a middleman. In the United States, this is often a 
task for the Harry Fox Agency, which is the largest such intermediary in the 
country. Theoretically, the music publisher could demand a rate that exceeds 
the statutory or mechanical royalty rate, as they are not compelled by a 
compulsory license to forfeit their work for any less. However, record labels 
will rarely offer to pay more than the statutory rate,85 so they will likely pay 
around that price for access to the work. 
																																																								85	Both	Fisher	and	Passman	describe	this	fact,	but	the	House	Judiciary	Committee	provides	a	more	thorough	elaboration	on	how	this	effect	came	to	be	in	their	1961	report:	
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Once a recording is made, that recording can be “publicly performed” 
over radio airwaves and on street corners by bussing musicians. As this is 
another right protected by copyright, a music publisher in this scenario would 
have the right to monitor these performances. However, they instead choose 
to use an aforementioned Performing Rights Organization (PRO) to do this 
monitoring on their behalf.86 There are three major PROs in the United 
States: BMI, ASCAP and — the significantly smaller — SESAC. PROs issue 
blanket licenses to performance venues, restaurants, retail stores, and radio 
stations, which provide access to their entire catalog of works for a flat rate. 
PROs then use formulas and tracking methods to divide their total revenues 
after overhead charges amongst their members based on the relative 
popularity of their works.87,88  
The description laid out above was only for the compositional 
copyright. The copyright for an audio recording navigates a different route 
through the industry. This section will begin with a recording artist, and 																																																																																																																																																																					“In	practice	the	authors	of	musical	works	generally	assign	their	recording	and	other	rights	to	publishers,	under	an	agreement	for	the	division	of	royalties.	But	in	most	instances	the	record	companies	secure	licenses	from	the	publishers,	thereby	avoiding	some	of	the	mechanics	of	notice	and	accounting	required	by	the	statute	for	exercise	of	the	compulsory	license.	But	the	statutory	rate	of	2	cents	per	record	operates	as	a	ceiling	on	the	royalty	rate	paid,	even	as	to	the	first	recording.”	86	PROs	could,	in	theory,	cut	the	publisher	out	of	the	equation.	However,	two	of	these	PROs	and	the	largest	of	them	—	ASCAP	and	BMI	—	are	prevented	from	doing	so	by	anti-trust	laws.	87	Passman,	supra	note	55	at	p.	242.	This	description	is	true	of	ASCAP	and	BMI;	SESAC	pays	its	signatories	negotiated	membership	fees	and	retains	the	remainder	as	a	profit.		88	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	51.	
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“their” song, and follow its copyright through the various exchanges it 
undergoes. For this section, when referring to the “song,” this will refer only 
to the recording of the song, not necessarily the underlying composition and 
the separate copyright that is parallel to it. 
A recording artist, like a songwriter or composer, often relinquishes 
their copyright to another entity. In this case, it is often handed off to a 
record label. Record labels offer some benefits to a recording artist in 
exchange for this transaction; first, recording an album is an expensive 
enterprise. It often requires a recording studio (which often has to be rented), 
producing, mixing and mastering, back up musicians, and may, as described 
above, require obtaining the rights to have the first recording of a 
composition. A record company could not only provide the funds for this 
project, but can also connect a recording artist with a network of contacts to 
bring all of the necessary actors into the project, and find a distributor for the 
album. Just the cost of making an album “can easily cost” $150,000,89 which 
makes the prospect of having someone cover those fees upfront attractive to 
recording artists. 
The recording artist will likely receive between 10 – 20% of the 
revenue generated by retail sales of their work as a part of their contract,90 
but their share will also be reduced by: 
																																																								89	Passman,	supra	note	55	at	p.	99.	90	Fisher,	supra	note	9	at	p.	55.	
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o Charges for the packaging of the album in its various formats 
(CD, LP, cassette, etc.) 
o Charges for “promotional copies” of the album which are sent to 
radio stations and other promoters for free 
o Charges for copies of the album that are produced and 
distributed but not sold at retail 
o A share of their revenue which will be split with the producer of 
the album 
There are various other deductions as well, such as promotional fees, advance 
recoupments, legal fees, and so forth. Though the record label will front the 
costs of the recording process, an artist is responsible for bringing that money 
back to the label. After all of the deductions and expenses that cut into a 
recording artist’s 10 — 20% share of revenue, it is likely for an artist to owe 
the record label more than what they generated. There are a virtually infinite 
number of anecdotes of this occurrence from even those at the top of the 
music industry, such as Thirty Seconds to Mars selling 2 million albums or 
Lyle Lovett selling 4.6 million albums and seeing zero dollars in album sales 
from their label.91 In 2018, Citigroup published an extensive report that 
determined that from the $43 billion generated by the music industry in 
																																																								91	Masnick,	Mike.	"RIAA	Accounting:	Why	Even	Major	Label	Musicians	Rarely	Make	Money	From	Album	Sales."	Techdirt.	July	13,	2010.	Accessed	December	13,	2018.	https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100712/23482610186.shtml		
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2017, just 12% of that sum found its way to the musicians themselves as a 
result of the numerous intermediaries and middlemen within the industry.92 
In signing a recording contract, the artist is often considered a “work 
made for hire,”93 meaning that while under their contract they will create 
copyrighted works, they will have no legal rights to the work. Legally, they 
are considered an employee working with the scope of their employment, and 
the owner of the copyright — i.e., the record label — is recognized as its 
original creator. This strips him or her of their right of termination, where 
thirty-five years after a transfer of copyright one can reclaim it. In this case, 
however, no legal transfer is recognized, and thus there is no right of 
termination applicable.94  
It is worth noting that as mentioned in the section on copyright, there 
is no public performance right for an audio recording in the United States. 
When a song is played on the radio, there are royalties generated under the 
compositional copyright, but not for the audio recording. This further 
handicaps potential revenue streams for a recording artist and increases the 
chance of one having an “unrecouped” balance for an album. 
 																																																								92	Bazinet,	Jason	B	et	al.	Putting	the	Band	Back	Together:	Remastering	the	
World	of	Music.	Report.	Citigroup.	2018.	1-88.	93	Passman,	supra	note	55	at	p.	341.	To	meet	all	of	the	legal	requirements	for	being	a	work	for	hire,	the	work	must	be	1)	commissioned	at	the	request	of	someone	else,	2)	there	must	be	a	written	agreement	explaining	that	the	work	is	for	hire,	and	3)	is	created	for	use	in	a	series	of	subcategories.	In	the	music	industry,	record	labels	consider	musical	recordings	to	fall	under	the	“collective	work”	category	as	an	album.	94	Passman,	supra	note	55	at	p.	344.	
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E.	Review	
 
There are two copyrights for a musical work in the United States: one 
for the composition, and another for an audio recording of that composition. 
These two copyrights are each governed by different yet overlapping entities 
in the music industry, based on the rights that each copyright affords and 
whether the creator is a composer or recording artist.  
Because of the complexities of these two copyrights, there is a 
complicated web of actors, each cutting in on the revenue that is generated 
from the royalties of a copyrighted work for the services that they provide. 
Even when a work is widely commercially successful in the United States, it 
is not unusual for its creators to see very little of the profits from it. This fact 
is more relevant than ever, as advancing technologies have been able to 
radically change the music industry both the ways in which royalties are 
generated and the magnitude of them. 
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IV.	A	Cost-Benefit	Analysis	of	the	Spotify	Streaming	Model	
 
With the context of the Spotify debate over artist royalties detailed 
from the recent history of Spotify and the music industry, as well as how 
copyright is underpinned and operates concerning musical recordings, we can 
now begin to analyze the benefits and detriments of the Spotify streaming 
model using a welfare economics approach.95 The main concern for this 
section of the thesis is whether or not the streaming model causes more harm 
to society than is necessary or tolerable as measured by wealth 
maximization, and balancing the dichotomy between incentive and access. 
With the streaming model, the question of fair compensation can be 
framed as a debate over fair incentives in a modern music industry where the 
bar for (legal) access to music has never been lower. Because streaming 
services offer a catalog of millions of songs to consumers for the same 
monthly price that they would have paid for a single album in the purchase 
model, access has inarguably been increased. The discourse at hand concerns 
whether or not this unprecedented access potentially creates too much drag 
on incentives. 
Before proceeding with this cost-benefit analysis, the inherent flaws 
with wealth maximization should be made apparent. The first is that in a 
system where utility or social good is being measured by money that those 
																																																								95	Welfare	economics	concerns	the	maximization	of	societal	wealth,	not	good	or	utility.	
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who are able to pay come out on top of those who are not able to do so, i.e., 
the wealthy come out on top of the destitute. Consider the case of a new drug 
that emerges on the market: for person x, the drug could save their life, while 
for person y, the drug would only create a short term, recreational high. The 
drug, however, is extraordinarily expensive, so much so that person x is 
merely unable to pay for it, whereas person y, who is a billionaire, has no 
issue paying upfront for the drug. Under wealth maximization, because 
person y is both able and willing to pay for the drug, he should receive it, 
even though person x may die without it. This example poses a moral 
dilemma for many people, including myself, but wealth maximization offers 
no course to rectify it. 
The second issue that this framework poses is the issue of marginal 
benefits. Using the same two people from above, if I were to give $100 to 
person x, it provides more benefit to them compared to giving $100 to a 
billionaire like person y. Though they have both received an extra $100, it 
represents less of percentage increase in a billionaire’s bank account than to 
someone with say a few thousand dollars in theirs. Again, wealth 
maximization does not account for marginal benefits like this and would 
value each distribution the same. 
I will not ignore the apparent problems from applying this framework, 
and will address concerns about distribution that arise by discussing them 
from outside of the framework. By arguing both from within this framework 
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and outside of it, I can address the concerns and analyses of not only 
economists but musicians as well. Despite the holes in welfare economics — 
which I will do my best to highlight and retort when applying this framework 
— I am choosing to use it because it is the most widely used approach within 
the field of economics, and makes the conclusions that I draw more directly 
comparable to the other voices within this debate.  
It is worth directly addressing a point that was alluded to in previous 
sections: the recording industry has never been known for its just 
compensation of musicians and artists. There have always been artists that 
have profited well beyond the incentive that they would need to create, while 
there have always been far more that do not recoup the costs of those 
investments in time and money.96 In this way, the debate chronicled 
throughout this thesis thus far fits squarely within previous criticisms of the 
industry. Unfortunately, some critics may be looking for solutions that will 
never be realized.  
Before delving into the raw data comparing the royalty payments of 
these respective systems, it is also crucial to reiterate the incentives-access 
paradigm, which is a paramount subject in this debate. While the more pre-
eminent issue for much of this thesis is the incentives received by artists in 
the form of royalties to encourage them to continue creating, the streaming 
model’s vast augmentation of access that the public has to recorded music is 																																																								96	This	fact	is	true	of	most,	if	not	all-creative	industries;	for	example,	consider	actors,	painters,	and	chefs,	who	may	all	put	significant	investments	into	their	work	and	see	little	in	return	for	it.	
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part of this picture as well. For about $10 — roughly the cost required for 
purchasing the average album on iTunes — consumers have access to 
millions of songs and artists for a full month. This is inarguably of great 
utility to the general public, as they have access to astronomically more 
content for significantly less. 
While the general public is undoubtedly the winner in this setup, the 
concern for this thesis focuses on incentives; can a system that provides a 
colossal amount of access strike the crucial balance with incentives that 
policymakers are concerned with? While many within the music industry as 
previously mentioned have lambasted Spotify for their perceived 
destabilizing of this balance, the startling answer is that Spotify has not only 
improved access but improved incentives as well.  
 
A.	Streaming	Royalties	vs.	Purchase	Royalties	
 
Streaming services are now generating more royalties for rights 
holders — not just revenues for the industry — than the album purchase 
model ever did over the past three decades. These royalties have been 
inherited not just by sound recording copyright holders, but by composition 
copyright holders as well.97  
																																																								97	Bazinet,	supra	note	89	at	p.	25.	
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Figure 2: Breakdown of music industry royalties generated by  
revenue source. Digital subscription services like Spotify and Apple 
Music generate a plurality of industry royalties as of 2017. Source: 
Putting the Band Back Together: Remastering The World of Music. 
Citigroup. Bazinet et al, page 24. 
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Figure 3: Breakdown of music industry revenues by copyright. 
Royalties generated by both the copyright for the recording and the 
copyright for the underlying composition are sharply increasing due to 
music subscription services like Spotify as seen from Figure 2. Source: 
Putting the Band Back Together: Remastering The World of Music. 
Citigroup. Bazinet et al, page 22. 
 
A 2018 Citigroup report entitled “Putting the Band Back Together” 
pegged total recording industry royalty payments at $7.3 billion in 2017, a 
record-breaking figure. Of that tally, streaming subscription services 
generated over $3 billion, well above the royalties now generated from any 
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other source (i.e., radio, sheet music, synchronization licenses) and now 
higher than the annual royalties ever generated from purchasing music. Both 
recorded music copyright holders and music publishers are receiving 
increased royalty payments as a result, though the royalties for the recording 
copyright have significantly outpaced those for the composition’s copyright.98  
The striking data that Citigroup presents should be trusted based on 
the following merits: Citigroup previously owned one of the “big four” record 
labels, EMI, in 2011, and counts Live Nation and Sirius XM amongst its 
investment clientele. The bank’s connections to and knowledge of the 
industry are also bolstered by the fact that it cited figures directly from the 
major labels like Warner Music, as well as the major PROs BMI and ASCAP, 
and the Harry Fox Agency. These figures match the trends described by 
Nielsen Soundscan, regarded as “the Bible” by industry protagonists, which 
show recording industry revenues soaring in the streaming era. 
What one can take from this data is that there is no crisis within the 
music industry. Revenues have begun to increase in the streaming era as 
evidenced in Section I, and Citigroup’s data indicates that these revenues 
have benefitted copyright holders in the form of increased royalties. Though 
some may argue that royalty payments within the industry as still 
insufficient by some standard, they are beyond sufficient by 2000 standards 
when the industry’s royalty payments previously plateaued.  																																																								98	Citigroup	reports	that	“The	publishers	suggest	the	compulsory	license	structure	in	the	U.S.	retards	the	economic	value	of	Music	Publishing,”	which	creates	this	disparity	between	recording	and	composition	royalties.	
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When launching their criticisms at the streaming model’s payment of 
artists, critics very often point to the album purchase model as being the 
exemplary and ideal state of the industry. These arguments in favor of the 
purchase model are often underpinned by another: that music should be 
purchased in order to place an inherent value upon it. Aforementioned critics 
like Taylor Swift, Björk, and other record labels, contend that Spotify’s free 
subscription tier dampens the value of music and art at large. 
There are a few points to consider in response to these arguments: first 
and foremost, even if Spotify users on the free subscription tier are not 
paying for access to the Spotify catalog with money, they are paying for it by 
listening to repeated advertisements. These advertisers are effectively paying 
for the free tier users to have access to Spotify’s catalog. If the issue is truly 
that consumers themselves should have to pay for music, then it is difficult to 
determine what an appropriate payment threshold would be. If $10 for an 
album is appropriate, what about $5? Or $1? Is the issue truly that 
consumers should merely pay something for an album, or are there more 
precise criteria that should be met?  
As Swift herself wrote, “…my prediction is that individual artists and 
their labels will someday decide what an album’s price point is. I hope they 
don’t underestimate themselves or undervalue their art.”99 Swift does not 
offer a solution to this dilemma, though understandably so, as she is a 
																																																								99	Linshi,	supra	note	35.	
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musician and not an economist or policymaker. The fact remains, however, 
that Swift’s argument doesn’t make sense in this framework or seemingly in 
any other; it doesn’t make sense to have people pay more for music just 
because, if incentives and access are both benefitting from this model.  
The criticisms raised against Spotify emerged mainly in the early 
2010s when subscription services were taking off but before they surpassed 
purchases in revenue. They are perhaps justified by the fact that the 
purchase model is the one that created the current recording industry setup 
to begin with, and any change to that model would precipitate a significant 
shift to an industry that has previously seen none, which would reasonably 
concern some. Now, however, these concerns appear to be outdated. 
While, again, wealth maximization does not concern itself with the 
distribution of wealth, but rather the maximization of it, there is a potential 
criticism that is worth dismissing outright. A critique when evaluating this 
data is that some genres, artists, and songs may be accumulating more of 
these royalties in such a disproportionate manner that some groups may 
actually be seeing fewer royalties than before. After all, as mentioned in 
Section I, a 2018 study found that the top 0.4% streamed songs on Spotify 
generated 10% of the company’s royalty payouts.100 This is, however, a 
significant improvement from the purchase model in digital (iTunes) era, 
where Page and Bud found that the top 0.4% of songs consolidated 80% of 
																																																								100	Ingham,	supra	note	5.	
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revenues, and that “85% of albums online never sold a single copy during the 
one year period of the study.”101 In the streaming era, more artists are 
receiving some degree of revenue stream from their recordings, i.e., more 
artists are being incentivized to create than before.   
The long-tail distribution of popularity that was so prolific in the 
purchase era has now been consolidated in the streaming era so that the 
additional wealth in the system is being shared amongst more artists and 
projects. As the question steering this thesis is whether or not the streaming 
model is sustainable for musicians, this data presents a picture that this 
model is, in fact, more sustainable for more musicians than the purchase 
model. In addition, with the long tail distribution being elongated as to 
capture more artists in it, the public now has more options to satisfy their 
preferences as well, another benefit of this system.  
 
B.	Streaming’s	Impact	on	Touring	
 
While it has been established that there is more money in circulation 
for copyright holders in the music industry thanks to music streaming, this 
new model has had a significant effect on the live music industry as well. 
Though consumers may be spending less money to listen to recorded music, 
they are not spending less money on music overall: the live music industry 
has grown significantly in the aftermath of the streaming model. This 																																																								101	As	synthesized	by	Day,	supra	note	56	at	p.	82.	
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relationship is not one just based on correlation, it is, in fact, a causal one: as 
consumers have the opportunity to listen to more music, streaming services 
fuel the discovery of new artists and thus fuel interest in live shows from 
those same artists.102  
Midia Research found that “the live music industry accounted for 33 
percent of overall industry revenue in 2000, compared to 53 percent 
attributed to retail recorded music. By 2016 that number shifted 
dramatically [with] live music garnering 43 percent as opposed to recorded 
music's dwindling 38 percent.”103 Musicians now see live performances 
constitute nearly 60% of their overall income; whereas live performances 
were previously seen as a means to an end in boosting record sales, and still 
are to a lesser extent, live music is now a vital source of income in its own 
right.104 In the same Citigroup report discussed at length above, Citigroup 
concluded that artists saw 12% of total music industry revenues, which was 
actually an improvement from 2000 when artists saw just 7% of industry 
revenue. Citigroup attributed the “bulk of the increase” to “strength in the 
concert business.”105 																																																								102	Sanchez,	Daniel.	"The	Live	Music	Industry	Will	Be	Worth	$31	Billion	Worldwide	by	2022."	Digital	Music	News.	October	26,	2018.	Accessed	March	10,	2019.	https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/10/26/latest-live-music-revenue-31-billion-2022/.		103	"How	Does	Live	Music	Impact	the	Music	Industry	Financially?"	U	Miami	Online.	January	08,	2018.	Accessed	March	10,	2019.	https://frostonline.miami.edu/articles/live-music-financial-impact-on-music-industry.aspx.		104	Id.	105	Bazinet,	supra	note	89	at	p.	3.	
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Musicians themselves have begun to capitalize on this connection.  In 
an editorial for Forbes, American Indie pop artist Vérité wrote that while her 
initial royalty payments from Spotify were nominal, she credits Spotify for 
constructing a dedicated fanbase for her that would attend her live shows: 
 
“I was not considering streaming as a path toward revenue. I knew 
Spotify paid less than pennies per stream…Much to my 
surprise…Streaming began to be and remains, by far, my largest 
source of income, contrary to what is popularly said. Streaming 
revenue has allowed me to…move forward knowing I have a channel of 
distribution that has provided me with a wealth of consistent, engaged 
listeners I get to convert into real fans…Spotify won’t build your 
career, nor is that its responsibility. It provides a platform for 
discovery. It will link your listeners to your merchandise and concerts, 
and it will provide back-end data for you to locate and analyze your 
followers.”106 
 
 
Spotify itself plays a role in funneling its subscribers to the live music 
industry. Artist pages allow tour dates to be integrated within its interface so 
that when a subscriber is on an artist’s page, they will see the nearest concert 
date from that artist.107 Spotify’s portal for labels and artists — Spotify for 
Artists — allows these groups to dissect Spotify’s data so that they can see 
fine-tuned streaming trends such as popular days of the week for artists and 																																																								106	V.	(2018,	March	19).	Spotify	Isn't	Killing	The	Music	Industry;	It's	A	Tool	For	Enterprising	Indie	Artists.	Retrieved	March	25,	2019,	from	https://www.forbes.com/sites/bizblog/2018/03/19/spotify-isnt-killing-the-music-industry-its-a-tool-for-enterprising-indie-artists/#266b84e1476b		Vérité	is	the	stage	name	for	musician	Kelsey	Regina	Byrne.	She	has	amassed	over	200	million	streams	on	Spotify	as	of	April	2019.	107	Artist	webstores	can	also	be	integrated	within	Spotify’s	interface	as	well	so	that	subscribers	can	be	directly	linked	to	an	artist’s	merchandise.	
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their songs, but perhaps most importantly, where their music is generating 
the most interest. This aspect is an underrated and under-analyzed one of 
streaming services; their ability to synthesize and disseminate complex data 
when “Just a decade ago, bands had to rely on information gathered by costly 
professional radio campaigns to determine where to book shows,” that is now 
provided by streaming services for free.108  
Spotify’s connections to the live music industry run even more directly 
than this, as can be seen by their collaborations with the Goliath of the live 
music scene, Live Nation. In 2018, Spotify executive Troy Carter announced 
that through their Fans First program that they had generated $40 million in 
ticket sales. The program is similar to the aforementioned Spotify For Artists 
portal in that it presents detailed listener information to artists and their 
teams, but it goes beyond this by being able “to target potential ticket-
buyers via email with special offers–in this case, the option to buy pre-sale 
concert tickets before they’re available elsewhere.”109 Since then, Live Nation 
has partnered with Spotify in creating tours for artists on popular Spotify 
playlists such as RapCaviar and Hot Country.110  																																																								108	McGuire,	Patrick,	Dan	Reifsnyder,	Angela	Mastrogiacomo,	and	Dre	DiMura.	"New	Trends	in	Touring	–	Soundfly."	Soundfly.	July	05,	2018.	Accessed	March	25,	2019.	https://flypaper.soundfly.com/hustle/new-trends-in-touring/.		109	Titlow,	J.	P.	(2017,	June	30).	Spotify's	Plan	To	Win	Over	Anxious	Artists–And	Win	The	Streaming	War.	Retrieved	March	25,	2019,	from	https://www.fastcompany.com/3068915/spotify-artists-streaming-playlists-data		110	Ingham,	T.	(2018,	June	26).	Spotify	generated	$40m	in	ticket	sales	last	year.	Now,	it's	accelerating	its	presence	in	live	music.	Retrieved	March	25,	2019,	from	https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/spotify-generated-40m-in-ticket-sales-last-year-now-its-accelerating-its-presence-in-live-music/		
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It is worth noting, however, that the growth of the touring industry in 
place of recording revenues has inevitably drawn some criticism. New York 
Times columnist Mike Errico argued in “Touring Can’t Save Musicians in the 
Age of Spotify” that as record labels feel the pinch of decreasing download 
and physical sales that the “360 deal” has become more prolific; a record deal 
by which the label is given profits from a musician’s live music and 
merchandising revenues, not just from their recorded music revenues. Record 
labels incur no “risk” in these deals and run the risk of running their artists 
into the ground physically under relentless touring schedules.111 While this 
concern may have been valid at the time it was written in early 2016 when 
recorded music revenues were decreasing, they have now begun to rise 
primarily due to music streaming, so it would follow that a record label’s 
dependence on the 360 deal would thus decrease in response. Musicians have 
toured regardless of the state of the recording industry; drawing a causal 
relationship between 360 deals and increased potential for injuries appears to 
be misplaced or at the very least marginal at best.  
Instead, the more valid criticism is that some artists do not want to 
tour or are physically unable to tour. Once musicians reach ages in their 80s 																																																								111	“But	labels	do	not	take	on	the	additional	risks	associated	with	their	additional	profits.	Instead	of	protecting	the	health	of	their	revenue-generating	engine,	they	simply	point	to	an	artist’s	independent-contractor	status,	which	releases	them	from	any	liability	they	would	be	on	the	hook	for	if	artists	were	labeled	employees.”	Errico,	Mike.	"Touring	Can't	Save	Musicians	in	the	Age	of	Spotify."	January	25,	2016.	Accessed	March	9,	2019.	https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/magazine/touring-cant-save-musicians-in-the-age-of-spotify.html.		
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and 90s, it becomes unrealistic to expect them to endure rigorous touring 
regimens to support themselves financially, as it would be to expect any 
octogenarian to perform physical labor. While these concerns are, again, 
legitimate, I believe that the problem remedied by the fact that streaming 
revenues continue to be generated by artists who are touring and those who 
aren’t, though the magnitude of those revenues may vary accordingly.  
As for those who don’t want to tour, a nomadic life on the road can 
precipitate life-endangering struggles on the road. Michael Angelakos of the 
American synthpop act Passion Pit told Consequence of Sound upon his brief 
stepping out from the music industry in 2017 that his battles with bipolar 
disorder, combined with “The risks associated with being a commercialized 
artist and embarking on a typical album release, like endless promotion and 
touring, have nearly killed me.”112 Despite this, Angelakos embarked upon a 
new tour in 2018 in order to cover the medical costs related to his mental 
health treatment.113 
Ultimately, the welfare economics analysis deployed in this section 
would contend that because there is more wealth in the music industry both 																																																								112	Geslani,	Michelle.	"Michael	Angelakos	Clarifies	Future	of	Passion	Pit:	"Protecting	Health	Is	the	First	Step	in	Maintaining	a	Culture's	Artistic	Output"."	Consequence	of	Sound.	July	25,	2017.	Accessed	March	31,	2019.	https://consequenceofsound.net/2017/07/michael-angelakos-clarifies-future-of-passion-pit-protecting-health-is-the-first-step-in-maintaining-a-cultures-artistic-output/.		113	Schatz,	Lake.	"Passion	Pit's	Michael	Angelakos	Says	He	Needs	to	Tour	to	Cover	Mental	Health	Medical	Costs."	Consequence	of	Sound.	January	18,	2018.	Accessed	March	31,	2019.	https://consequenceofsound.net/2018/01/passion-pits-michael-angelakos-says-he-needs-to-tour-to-cover-mental-health-medical-costs/.		
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live and recorded because of streaming than previously, that an arrangement 
more dependent on live music would be preferential to the prior one. Outside 
of this frame, it is important to note the case of Angelakos as to be 
considerate to the many musicians like him who struggle with mental 
illnesses. However, it is equally important to recognize that those who 
struggle with mental illness working in any profession may have to work in 
some capacity in order to pay the costs of their medical treatment in the 
United States. The music industry, in this way, is no exception to this 
predicament and ultimately, the issue lies outside of the industry itself.  
While the growth of the live music industry as a result of the 
streaming model’s explosion may alter the way that musicians structure their 
careers, it is not a requirement that they increase their touring regimens. 
Given that more royalties are being paid out for their songs and recordings, 
the expansion of the concert industry only provides an extra opportunity for 
them to receive more money than before. In short, the live music industry’s 
growth has created an avenue for further increasing incentives for its 
performers with no collateral damage to recording incentives.  
 
C.	Reshaping	the	Music	Industry	
 
Spotify provides a unique opportunity for artists to distribute their 
music to their service without intermediary services. Historically, musicians 
would need to pay to both create and distribute physical manifestations of 
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their recordings, and even in the digital age would need to use a third party 
to have their music uploaded to outlets like iTunes for retail. However, 
Spotify’s For Artist portal now allows musicians who own the copyright to 
their works to upload directly to the service.  
As mentioned in chapter three, royalties and revenues for musicians 
are often siphoned off by the multiple bodies associated with disseminating 
and protecting their works, like record labels, publishers and PROs, and 
distributors. What Spotify is essentially offering to independent musicians is 
the ability to reduce distribution costs to $0 and increase their capacity to 
recoup the investments into their music. It is worth mentioning that this 
option is only available to independent musicians who own their own 
copyright; recording artists signed to labels would not personally see the 
benefit of distribution costs being reduced in the same manner. 
Just as Spotify is cutting distributors out of the picture, they may have 
their crosshairs on a much larger target: record labels. It has been widely 
speculated that Spotify may make its own foray into the recording industry 
by signing artists and generating their own content rather than relying solely 
on the catalogs of record labels.114 The groundwork for this vertical 
integration has already been laid: the New York Times reported in 
September of 2018 that Spotify “has quietly struck direct licensing deals with 
a small number of independent artists. The deals give those artists a way 																																																								114	Kopf,	Dan.	"Why	Spotify	Wants	to	Be	like	Netflix	Now."	Quartz.	February	06,	2019.	Accessed	April	01,	2019.	https://qz.com/1543627/why-spotify-wants-to-be-like-netflix-now/.		
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onto the streaming platform and a closer relationship to the company — an 
advantage when pitching music for its influential playlists — while bypassing 
the major labels altogether.”115  
While record labels have been decisive in propelling the careers of 
virtually every industry juggernaut imaginable, the musicians working 
directly with Spotify have instant access to nearly 200 million global users, 
receive preference in playlisting opportunities,116 and preserve the copyright 
to their works. American Idol contestant Mia Coleman told Bloomberg with 
respect to her deal with Spotify that “It’s an all-around positive for me…I 
have complete control. I have more money. I choose how I get branded.”117 
The scenario above has a striking equivalent within the film industry 
that can help to illuminate the issue. Netflix, much like Spotify, is the 
product of rapid digitization and offers recurring monthly subscriptions to its 
users who in turn have access to a catalog of TV shows, documentaries, and 
movies licensed to Netflix by various production companies. While early in its 
inception Netflix relied solely on previously created content for its services, it 
has since garnered significant attention for its original series and films 																																																								115	Sisario,	Ben.	"A	New	Spotify	Initiative	Makes	the	Big	Record	Labels	Nervous."	September	06,	2018.	Accessed	March	27,	2019.	https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/business/media/spotify-music-industry-record-labels.html.		116	Spotify’s	playlists	represent	major	promotional	opportunities	for	musicians	of	all	levels	of	notoriety.		117	Shaw,	Lucas.	"Spotify	to	Musicians:	Let	Us	Be	Your	Label."	Bloomberg.com.	November	9,	2018.	Accessed	March	27,	2019.	https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-09/spotify-to-musicians-let-us-be-your-label.		
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beginning in 2012. With shows like House of Cards and Orange is the New 
Black and films like 2019’s Roma, Netflix has received the highest accolades 
in the industry such as Golden Globes, Emmy Awards, and Academy Awards 
(Oscars). 
 Netflix’s original content has not only legitimized the company as a 
production company, but it has also helped to reverse its financial fortunes 
after years of negative net revenues. By creating its own (successful) content, 
Netflix has saved significant money on negotiating licensing costs from other 
production companies over the long term. For a company like Spotify, which 
has only become profitable within the last year despite significant revenues 
and market penetration, Netflix’s success in cutting out the middlemen will 
likely precede Spotify pursuing a similar course of action. 
Back within the recording industry, it is a concern that record labels 
may be undercut by Spotify offering these exclusive distribution deals 
directly to artists, but there are a few worthwhile considerations: first and 
foremost, independent artists have always existed within the recording 
industry, and record labels have endured their presence thus far. In offering 
these distribution deals to musicians that come with advances,118 Spotify 
becomes the sole distributor for one’s catalog, which may doubt alienate those 
who wish to have their music available on multiple platforms such as Apple 
																																																								118	An	advance	is	a	payment	made	to	an	artist	in	advance	of	the	release	of	their	work,	that	then	must	be	recouped	by	the	artist	before	they	begin	seeing	royalty	payments	directly	deposited	to	them,	as	mentioned	in	chapter	two.	
	 67	
Music, Amazon, Tidal, etc. Record labels, on the other hand, are significantly 
more likely to offer multiple retailers to its artists.  
For those musicians who neither want to sign to a record label nor 
strike an exclusive deal with Spotify, they may use the Spotify For Artists 
portal and upload their copyrighted works directly to the service, and seek for 
other avenues of distribution on their own. While Spotify is providing 
mechanisms to accommodate independent musicians, record labels will buffet 
some of the risk associated with being independent for their signees, most 
notably the costs of recording an album. The choice for musicians concerning 
the distribution of their catalogs, therefore, concerns which balance of risk 
and exclusivity they wish to strike.  
In this world, record labels would still be likely to endure as a central 
entity within the industry; record labels in the streaming era will continue to 
offer an array of services in a single deal that have a wide appeal to many 
artists, beyond just covering the initial cost of recording. Record labels 
connect artists with songwriters, producers, PR teams and managers, and 
offer access to their marketing and advertising departments as well. In 2018, 
the RIAA reported that the major labels — Universal, Warner and Sony —
have begun to sign more artists than when the industry was in decline; when 
industry revenues hit a nadir in 2014, the majors signed 589 new artists. In 
2017, with industry revenues rising once again thanks to streaming services, 
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they signed 658 new acts.119 While smaller record labels may struggle to 
adapt to a changing industry, larger ones will likely be able to weather any 
further storms that emerge as a result of the streaming model.  
While independent musicians seeing more money in their bank 
accounts and record labels cutting down on distribution costs may seem to be 
an unusual arrangement where both groups win, a new consideration may 
emerge for those who work for distributors. Just as there are people who 
depend on creating music for their careers, there are also those who depend 
on distributing that music for their careers. In an industry where artists 
upload directly and for free to a distributor like Spotify, those who work for 
traditional distributors like CD and vinyl producers are then undercut. The 
quick response to this problem is that welfare economics would not make 
special consideration for their case. Because welfare economics only concerns 
the maximization of wealth and not the distribution of that wealth, these 
types of workers would not be accounted for in any meaningful manner.  
I would argue that having more options available to creators is more 
valuable than having more traditional but more limited options. By giving 
musicians more opportunity to choose how they want to structure their 
careers and the distribution of their music, one would likely see musicians 
overall gain more autonomy over their creations and thus increase their 
satisfaction within the music industry. Given that most record labels and 																																																								119	Glazier,	Mitch.	"50	Million	Reasons	For	Optimism."	Medium.	February	28,	2019.	Accessed	May	02,	2019.	https://medium.com/@RIAA/50-million-reasons-for-optimism-d70cff45c8ab.		
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current industry structures would survive an industry arrangement with 
these extra options available, there appears to be no reason why these 
options should not be welcomed if they are of such benefit to musicians. With 
the new alternative career path that artists have by working directly with 
Spotify, there is a new approach to the industry that can better fit the needs 
and desires of more musicians. This would likely incentive more musicians to 
create, as they would have new recourse to navigate their careers on their 
own terms, at no foreseeable cost or change to the public’s access.  
 
D.	Copyright	Policy	Adjustments	
 
One of the recurring considerations of this thesis was that of the 
policymaker and public policy. It is the duty of lawmakers to make 
adjustments to policy whenever appropriate to best serve the needs of the 
public. In the era of music streaming, copyright law is working effectively to 
ensure that artists are incentivized and that the public has reasonable access 
to their works. 
As discussed in Section I, copyright law was struggling in the digital 
era to police unauthorized reproductions of music via piracy. Though these 
reproductions were undoubtedly illegal, it was an arduous task for the 
government to track these illicit downloads and prevent them. What Spotify 
and other streaming services have seemingly managed to do is capture 
Internet users who previously pirated music and convinced them to subscribe 
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to their services as a matter of convenience. Pirating music often requires 
visiting numerous domains to obtain the desired file in the ideal format and 
quality at the risk of contracting a computer virus, whereas streaming 
services provide a simple interface and large quantities of high-quality music 
for relatively low prices. The argument purported by Spotify executives that 
they have monetized “existing consumer behavior” is seemingly valid now 
that consumers are individually paying less for access to music yet the 
recording industry is generating more revenue. 
What this means for policymakers is that the industry has come up 
with its own solution to copyright law’s inadequate enforcement. The 
protections provided by copyright are enough to generate revenue for 
copyright holders, while music consumers have been convinced and even 
corralled by the industry to no longer engage in illicit behavior. As incentives 
and access have benefitted from the streaming model, how, then, should 
lawmakers respond? The answer is seemingly that they should not respond 
at all based on the criteria we’ve established. The music industry is not in an 
economic crisis relative to its peak in the 2000s. Policymakers should only 
tweak music copyright law if they believe that the current system has always 
been inefficient, which is well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Despite this, Congress and the Trump administration have already 
reacted to the dominance of the streaming model by passing the Orrin Hatch 
Music Modernization Act in late 2018. Though the act is a consolidation of 
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numerous bills and thus has a myriad of provisions that affect areas of the 
industry outside of streaming services, it does improve certain inefficiencies 
with these services that are otherwise not covered in this analysis. Streaming 
services have encountered difficulty with identifying copyright holders for 
recordings in the past, which has resulted in a class action lawsuit against 
Spotify totaling $43.4 million;120 now, a new governing agency will create 
databases and handle the identification of these copyright holders on their 
end.121  
A difficulty in trying to adjust copyright policy in the streaming era is 
that its meteoric rise to industry prominence has meant that data and 
evaluations of the model lose insight rather quickly. For example, Richardson 
in 2014 suggested a reevaluation of compulsory licenses in music copyright 
law due to the fact that “…compulsory licensing sets a price floor for one 
party; in this case, it is the record labels. In the current framework, content 
owners can insist on receiving a minimum of the compulsory rate, and thus 
come to the table with significantly more bargaining power than 																																																								120	When	Spotify	struggled	to	find	the	publishers	for	songs,	it	would	set	aside	money	to	pay	them	once	they	were	identified.	This,	while	noble,	was	not	compliant	with	the	law.			Levine,	Robert.	"Spotify	Settles	Class	Action	Lawsuits	Filed	By	David	Lowery	and	Melissa	Ferrick	With	$43.4	Million	Fund."	Billboard.	May	27,	2017.	Accessed	April	27,	2019.	https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7809561/spotify-settles-class-action-lawsuits-filed-by-david-lowery-and-melissa.		121	It	is	worth	noting	that	these	sort	of	technical	errors	with	the	programs	behind	streaming	services	are	likely	to	persist	in	varying	degrees.		Singleton,	Micah.	"Congress	May	Actually	Fix	Music	Royalties."	The	Verge.	January	26,	2018.	Accessed	April	28,	2019.	https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/26/16931966/congress-music-modernization-act-licensing-royalties.		
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distributors.”122  Richardson proposed that each license would be set “equal to 
each individual platform’s net revenue,” so that distributors would have “an 
obvious incentive to negotiate with content providers.”123  
The shortcoming with his solution is that it was based on the 
contemporary data, which reasonably suggested that Spotify would struggle 
to become profitable without creating its own content like Netflix. Because at 
the time, “streaming services continue to experience substantial losses, there 
is a need for a solution that brings both parties — content owners and 
content distributors — to the table” to negotiate.124 However, Spotify, for the 
first time earlier this year, announced that it had become profitable without 
generating its own content to the same degree that Netflix has begun to do 
so, though as previously mentioned, Spotify has begun to experiment with 
doing so. This thus undermines a significant pillar of Richardson’s solution, 
which assumes that streaming services will be compelled to negotiate 
because they were struggling to become profitable. As the industry landscape 
continues to change rapidly in this new era, it becomes progressively more 
difficult to pin down potential policy adjustments that could be pursued and 
justified. 
 
																																																								122	Richardson,	James	Harold.	"The	Spotify	Paradox:	How	the	Creation	of	a	Compulsory	License	Scheme	for	Streaming	On-Demand	Music	Services	Can	Save	the	Music	Industry."	SSRN	Electronic	Journal,	2014.	doi:10.2139/ssrn.2557709.	123	Id.	124	Id.	
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Conclusion	
 
The music industry has buffeted radical changes as a result of rapid 
digitization over the past several decades, from the rise of the CD, to the 
mp3, and now, music streaming services. During those shifts, industry 
revenues rose sharply and often dropped just as precipitously, threatening 
sources of income for musicians, and thus a pivotal piece of human culture as 
well. Each of these innovations has induced a myriad of complex problems 
that require swift adjustments not only from policymakers but from industry 
entities and protagonists as well. 
The paramount, guiding question for this thesis was whether or not a 
recording industry so dependent on a model that requires individual users to 
pay less for access to music was sustainable for musicians and songwriters. 
Was a model that provided so much access for so little capable of providing 
enough incentives for musicians to continue to create? The startling answer 
here is that not only is access benefitting from this system, but incentives are 
as well. Music industry revenues and royalties are higher than they’ve ever 
been in the past forty plus years. The effects of the streaming model have 
reached outside of just the recording industry, but have helped to stimulate a 
surge in the live music industry as well. 
The explanation for how revenues are increasing in an era when 
consumers are paying less per person for access to music than before is the 
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not only lowing the bar for access but also providing millions of high-quality 
copies of music in one safe, searchable system, people are thereby 
incentivized to subscribe to a legitimate music distributor than an illicit one. 
While there was more focus on recording artists and their incentives 
for the purposes of this thesis, those who are not performers have also 
seemingly benefitted from the system as well. Royalties for the musical 
composition copyright have risen in the streaming era, and are tracking to 
surpass their peak levels from 2000. With the expansion of the live music 
industry, songwriters stand to gain from having their works performed more 
frequently to larger audiences. 
With that being said, these benefits should not be conflated with 
absolute perfection. Though the streaming model may be superior to the 
purchase model in its incentivizing of musicians, this fact does not 
necessarily imply that the streaming model cannot still be improved.125 
Though Spotify is helping to close the schism between the over-incentivized 
and under-incentivized musicians by allowing consumers to listen to a 
greater number of musical projects, it is not the end of the conversation. 
Rather, it is a starting point for moving forward with this trajectory. 
 																																																								125	The focus of this paper was largely on recording artists, and did not take 
into account the numerous other actors that help create a piece of music, 
from producers and instrumentalists, to A&R executives who are left out of 
this royalty system. There may indeed be necessary reforms to properly 
compensate these people as well, but they are unfortunately outside of the 
scope of this thesis.	
	 75	
Glossary		
 
This Glossary is not intended to be all encompassing, but rather assist the 
reader as they navigate this work and the numerous terms that illuminate it. 
 
Advance — money that is paid upfront to a recording artist that is owed 
back to the entity that provided it, most often a record label. The advance is 
recouped by royalties from a copyrighted work, and after the advance is fully 
recouped royalties begin going toward the artist. 
Analog recording — a copy of sound recording that is manifested in a 
tangible manner so that when properly used, it recreates the sounds of a 
recording. Examples include vinyl LPs and cassette tapes. The quality of each 
successive copy degrades. 
Compulsory license — A license that the owner of a copyright is forced or 
compelled to issue. In the United States, for example, radio stations have the 
right to compel songwriters to license their songs to them for radio play after 
meeting various criteria. For more, see:  
Copyright — “the exclusive legal right, given to an originator or an assignee 
to print, publish, perform, film, or record literary, artistic, or musical 
material, and to authorize others to do the same.”126 
																																																								126	Merriam-Webster	Dictionary,	s.v.	“copyright,”	accessed	April	22,	2019,	https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/copyright	
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Digital download — the digital transfer of a file to a receiver that can 
decode and process it, such as a computer or mp3 player. Song purchases 
from iTunes, for example, result in digital downloads. 
Dynamic production — producing a new expressive work, including by 
building on preexisting expressive works. 
Incentive-access paradigm — the push and pull that strikes to achieve the 
optimal balance between providing incentives to creators to continue 
creating, but also to create a system that provides as much access to the 
public as possible. 
Intellectual property — the set of legal rights in intangible resources (ex. 
artistic works) that treats them as property by giving the creator exclusive 
rights in their use. This should not be used as a synonym for creative works. 
Mechanical royalty — royalties paid to a songwriter (or the owner of the 
copyright for the musical composition) when a copy of that work is produced. 
Napster — A peer-to-peer file sharing website launched in 1999 that was 
sued by the RIAA in A&M Records, Inc. vs. Napster Inc. and found to be 
infringing upon the copyright of songs. 
Nielsen Soundscan — An information and tracking organization that has 
tracked sales and airplay data in the United States since 1991, partnering 
with Billboard magazine.  
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Nonexcludability — The quality of expressive works or ideas that makes 
them difficult if not impossible to prevent them from being made widely 
available once they are first made public. 
Non-interactive service — A music streaming service that does not allow 
users to choose individual tracks to play. 
Nonrivalrous — The quality of expressive works or ideas that makes it so 
that one person’s enjoyment of a piece of work does not effect another’s 
similar enjoyment of the same work. 
On-demand streaming service — A music streaming service that does 
allow users to choose individual tracks to play. 
Piracy — The illicit downloading or copying of copyrighted materials 
without permission. 
Publisher — the entity responsible for ensuring that songwriters receive 
compensation for the sale and/or reproduction of their work. 
Performing Rights Organization (PRO) — 
Record label — A company that signs contracts with musicians to help 
record, market, and promote their recordings. Often record labels maintain 
ownership of an artist’s recordings, not the artist themselves.  
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) — An organization 
representing record labels and distributors that conducts research as well as 
lobbying on their behalf. They are also the entity responsible for certifying 
albums and singles Gold, Platinum, Multi-Platinum, etc.  
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Static use — The use of existing expressive works in order to enjoy the value 
of it.  
Statutory Rate — “the rate set forth by the Copyright Arbitration Royalty 
Panel for compulsory mechanical licenses. Assuming the work has been 
previously released to the public, this is the licensing fee the licensee can pay 
to sell a cover version of a song without having to obtain direct permission 
from the rightsholder. In the US, this rate is currently set at 9.1¢ per track or 
1.75¢ for each minute of playing time, whichever is greater.”127  
Streaming — A method of digitally delivering a file to a user’s device so that 
the given file is never stored in its entirety at any one time. Streaming is 
utilized in music by services such as Spotify, Apple Music, Tidal, and Amazon 
Music, but also for film and TV by services such as Netflix and Hulu. 
Utilitarianism — “The doctrine that an action is right insofar as it promotes 
happiness, and that the greatest happiness of the greatest number should be 
the guiding principle of conduct.”128 
Welfare economics — “The model of economics that seeks to evaluate the 
effects of economic policy on the well being of a given community.”129  
 
 																																																								127	Songtrust,	s.v.	“statutory	mechanical	rate,”	accessed	April	22,	2019,	https://www.songtrust.com/music-publishing-glossary/glossary-statutory-mechanical-royalty-rate	128	Oxford	Dictionaries,	s.v.	“utilitarianism,”	accessed	April	22,	2019,		https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/utilitarianism	129	Britannica,	s.v.	“welfare	economics,”	accessed	April	22,	2019,			https://www.britannica.com/topic/welfare-economics	
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